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231 
NOTES 
 Anonymity and International Law 
Enforcement in Cyberspace 
Jonathan I. Edelstein* 
INTRODUCTION 
A.  A Plausible Scenario? 
It is the morning of April 11, 2000, on Grand Cayman Is-
land.1  Larry Smith,2 having finished his breakfast, ambles 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1997; e-mail address 
jonathan@soho.ios.com.  I would like to thank, first and foremost, Professor 
Abraham Abramovsky for his invaluable moral and scholarly assistance in the 
production of this Note.  I also wish to thank Ruby Bradley, Guy Cohen, Cal 
Davis, Richard Dini, Gail Donoghue, Renee Farrell-Duval, Susan Finkenberg, 
Lyle Frank, Mike Geary, Doron Gopstein, Zena Johnson, Simon Kok, Sherrill 
Kurland, Denise McCracken, John McGowan, Jane Momo, Tom Nerney, Ken 
Reid, Linda Speranza, and David Steiner (in other words, the gang at the Corpo-
ration Counsel’s office) for their unfailing encouragement. 
1. Compare this scenario with the situation described in Businesses Promote 
Fraud Tools on the Internet; Web Shows How to Hide One’s Identity, Use Offshore Ac-
counts for Secret Stocks, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 15, 1996, at D4 [hereinafter 
Businesses Promote Fraud Tools].  This article describes a corporation known as 
Privacy Tools Inc.  (“Privacy Tools”), which: 
[W]ill sell a bogus passport imprinted with any name the customer se-
lects.  Claiming to be based in Estonia, it sells passports from a Web 
page in Anguilla, British West Indies.  The company says its ‘camou-
flage’ passport ensures ‘total anonymity’ for tasks such as opening an 
offshore bank account. . . . The company also sells international driver’s 
licenses and press cards ‘issued by a bona fide European press agency’ 
under any name a customer desires. 
Id.  Privacy Tools rents its Web site from an Anguilla-based Internet access pro-
vider called Offshore Information Services, operated by Vince Cate, a 32-year-old 
island entrepreneur.  Cate has never met the owner of Privacy Tools and knows 
him only as “Richard.”  Id.  Offshore Information Services, which advertises 
openly that it is “offshore and on-line,” offers its customers “a new offshore iden-
tity over which [they] have total control,” even allowing customers to provide 
the computer on which their offshore anonymous account will be established. 
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over to the small office he keeps in his home and boots up 
the waiting computer terminal. 
Only a year before, the Cayman Islands had possessed 
only one Internet3 access provider4 of their own.  Now, 
thanks to the Computer Privacy Act that the Cayman legisla-
ture had passed in December, there are 182 access services 
operating in the Caymans.  Not entirely coincidentally, 179 
of these are anonymous remailers—services which forward 
information to another destination while concealing the 
identity of its source.5 
                                                                                                                                  
John Graham-Cumming, Caught Up in a Web of Deceit, GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 
13, 1996, at 11.  Incidentally, in a rare example of events occurring simultane-
ously with scholarship, Offshore Information Services opened shortly after the 
writing of the first draft of this Note. 
2. All names used in this scenario are fictional. 
3. The Internet “is a worldwide entity whose nature cannot be easily or sim-
ply defined. . . . [T]he Internet is the ‘set of all interconnected I[nternetworking] 
P[rotocol] networks’—the collection of several thousand local, regional, and 
global computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP Internet-
working Protocol suite. . . .”  DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 
16 (1994), cited in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
A 1995 magazine article also cited in Netcom describes the Internet in a more 
colloquial way as: 
[A] collection of thousands of local, regional and global Internet Proto-
col networks.  What it means in practical terms is that millions of com-
puters in schools, universities, corporations, and other organizations are 
tied together via telephone lines.  The Internet enables users to share 
files, search for information, send electronic mail, and log onto remote 
computers.  But it isn’t a program or even a particular computer re-
source.  It remains only a means to link computer users together. . . . 
  No one pays for the Internet because the network itself doesn’t exist 
as a separate entity.  Instead various universities and organizations pay 
for the dedicated lines linking their computers.  Individual users may 
pay an Internet provider for access to the Internet via its server. 
David Bruning, Blasting Along the InfoBahn, ASTRONOMY, June 1995, at 74. 
4. An Internet access provider is a computer connected to the Internet via 
dedicated telephone lines, through which members of the public can access the 
Internet, usually for a fee.  See Bruning, supra note 3, at 76. 
5. See Steve Harris, E-Mail:  No Names, No Pack Drill:  Steve Harris Finds Out 
How You Can Send Untraceable Messages Over the Internet, GUARDIAN (LONDON), 
Oct. 6, 1994, at 5.  An anonymous remailer, or an “anonymous posting service,” 
removes identifying information from electronic mail messages received from its 
users and replaces it with a numbered anonymous account identifier.  Id.  The 
messages are then forwarded in accordance with forwarding orders specified by 
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Smith, one of the Caymans’ budding computer entrepre-
neurs, is the proprietor of four of these anonymous remail-
ers, all run from his home. He has never met any of his cli-
ents face to face.  Each of his services has approximately 
1,000 accounts, of which all but four or five have never been 
used.  The remainder provide him with an income of $1,000 
per account per month,6 plus a fee for each message for-
warded.  Of course, Smith only sees half of this money; the 
Cayman government levies a hefty tax on Internet accounts. 
With the terminal booted up, Smith scans the previous 
day’s activity on Caymanon, his oldest and most profitable 
remailer.  There has been an unusual amount of mail re-
ceived and forwarded to the holder of an active account; 
clearly, one of Smith’s clients is doing business. What sort of 
business this may be, Smith neither knows nor wants to 
know.  The less he knows, in fact, the better for his peace of 
mind. . . . 
More than 1,500 miles away from Smith, Paul Anderson 
sits in his living room in New Jersey and checks his elec-
tronic mail.7 His Caymanon account has been busy; seven 
requests from new clients anxious to purchase from his gal-
lery of select photography, as well as a number of orders 
from established customers.  The government may take a 
dim view of Anderson’s business8—after all, some of the 
                                                                                                                                  
the user.  Id.  Harris is the GUARDIAN’s chief commentator on Internet issues. 
6. Offshore Information Services’ fees range from $20 per month for an off-
shore e-mail address to $300 per month for “a complete identity” over which the 
user has total control.  Graham-Cumming, supra note 1, at 11.  Considering the 
greater risk involved with an anonymous remailer service dedicated exclusively 
to criminal purposes, a fee of $1,000 per month does not seem unreasonable for 
an account on the hypothetical Caymanon service. 
7. Electronic mail, or e-mail, is “a communications service for computer us-
ers wherein textual messages are sent to a central computer system, or electronic 
‘mailbox,’ and later retrieved by the addressee.  E-mail usually refers to private 
messages.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS 205 (5th ed. 
1994). 
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (criminalizing the sexual exploitation of mi-
nors).  According to 18 U.S.C. § 2252, any person who knowingly receives, trans-
ports, or distributes in interstate or foreign commerce any visual depiction in-
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subjects of his photographs are under the age of consent and 
are shown in compromising positions—but Anderson sees 
himself as a businessman in the American tradition, filling 
an available market niche.9 Certainly, none of his customers 
has ever complained. 
Anderson switches to another file, and begins the process 
of filling orders.  By the time his digitized photographs pass 
through Caymanon—and three other anonymous remail-
ers—and reach his customers, the source of the photographs 
will be identified only by a numbered anonymous account.  
Even if the authorities find one of Anderson’s customers, all 
the American court orders in the world would never suffice 
to obtain his name from Caymanon.10 The Cayman com-
                                                                                                                                  
volving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct may be impris-
oned up to 10 years for a first offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2252.  The statute specifically 
provides that transportation of such material by means of a computer is punish-
able under the law. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). 
9. The availability of pornography over the Internet, including child por-
nography, has been widely commented upon.  See, e.g., Hearing on Child Pornog-
raphy on the Internet, before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1995) 
(statement of Barry F. Crimmins, writer and child activist); 141 CONG. REC. S8310, 
S8329 (1995) (statements of Sen. James Exon in support of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996); Hearing on Encryption Legislation, before the Senate Commerce 
Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, de-
tailing an instance where child pornography was encrypted and transmitted via 
the Internet); Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhigh-
way:  A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories and Animations 
Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, 
Provinces and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995); Anne Wells Branscomb, Internet 
Babylon?  Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography on the Information Super-
highway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1935 (1995); see also  
David Connett et. al., The Net Tightens on Child Abusers, OBSERVER (LONDON), 
Sept. 1, 1996, at 18 (citing a study by Prof. Harold Thimbleby, Middlesex Univer-
sity, which concluded that nearly half of the 11,000 most repeated Internet search 
requests were for pornography and that the most visited Internet cites were por-
nographic); Angela Long, Norwegians to “Police” Internet for Child Porn, IRISH 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996, at 10 (detailing the activities of the Norwegian branch of 
Save the Children, an international child welfare organization, to monitor the 
Internet for child pornography); Charles Arthur, How Porn Slipped the Net, 
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), July 31, 1995, at 13-14 (describing the use of anonymous 
remailers in transmitting pornography over the Internet). 
10. In the absence of a treaty, the “overriding primary rule of international 
law” is the sovereignty of the state.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990).  Among the principles which inhere from 
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puter privacy law, which protects the identity of Internet us-
ers from the prying eyes of law enforcement, is practically 
foolproof—as it very well should be; Anderson and others 
like him had certainly spent enough money making sure it 
would. 
Money well spent, thinks Anderson as he adds the seven 
new addresses to his customer file.  Doing business is so 
much easier now—not to mention the convenience of having 
his Internet provider on the same island as his checking ac-
count. . . . 
B. New Media, New Problems 
The Internet, the amalgamation of computer networks 
that carries an ever-increasing portion of the world’s infor-
mation traffic,11 is at the forefront of both information tech-
nology and the law.12 With the growth of the Internet to in-
clude access services in more than 150 countries,13 the 
                                                                                                                                  
the sovereignty of the state are prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over territory 
and population within the state, and the duty of non-intervention in other states’ 
territory.  Id.  The first of these would provide, in the present scenario, that the 
courts of the Cayman Islands would have exclusive jurisdiction over Caymanon, 
and the second would preclude American courts from intervening in the legal 
procedures of the Cayman Islands. 
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (defining the Internet). 
12. For a sampling of the legal issues which have grown up around the In-
ternet, see the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 
110 Stat. 56, 132-36 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996)); see also Georgia Computer 
Systems Protection Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-90 through § 16-9-94 (1996); Shea 
v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) (challenging the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act); 
Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(addressing the issue of Internet access services’ liability as republishers for de-
famatory material carried on their networks); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (addressing Internet access providers’ liability for 
violation of copyright by their users).  It is also noteworthy that a recent search 
on LEXIS using the search term “Internet” turned up almost 600 law review arti-
cles.  Search of LEXIS, LAWREV library, ALLREV file (Sept. 2, 1996). 
13. See Peter H. Lewis, Outlook 1995:  Technology & Media Trying to Find Gold 
with the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at C15 (indicating that Internet access is 
currently available from 159 countries). 
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exchange of ideas across international borders has become 
inexpensive and easy.14 An ordinary person with a home 
computer can now reach an audience of millions,15 a feat 
previously possible only for those with access to mass me-
dia.16 
Along with its benefits to the international marketplace 
of ideas,17 however, the spread of the Internet has also 
opened doors to new and sophisticated types of crime.18 
Since 1990, especially, the world has seen a proliferation of 
frauds,19 data theft,20 trafficking in pornography21 and pi-
 
14. See Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4 (quoting Rob Ber-
trum, chairman of the Internet fraud committee of the North American Securities 
Administrators Association, as saying that the Internet “lowers the barriers to 
entry for those people who would defraud”).  Criminals might save the time and 
expense of such techniques as cold-calling prospective victims, mass mailings 
and publishing newsletters by using a World Wide Web (“WWW”) site to solicit 
investors.  Id.  The World Wide Web is a network of Internet resources linked by 
“hypertext” messages which contain the Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) ad-
dresses of other related resources.  By means of the WWW, it is possible to fol-
low hypertext links through an unending chain of cross-referenced resources.  
See Douglas Dangerfield, Web Surfing, or “The Internet for the Uninformed”, AMER. 
BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1996 at *5-*6. 
15. See George P. Long III, Who Are You?:  Identity and Anonymity in Cyber-
space, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (1994); see also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (indi-
cating that Internet access was available to an estimated 40 million users as of 
early 1996, a figure which is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999).  In consid-
ering a constitutional challenge to the Communications Decency Act, the South-
ern District in Shea made extensive findings of fact concerning the history of the 
Internet, its uses, and the availability of sexually explicit materials on-line.  See id. 
at 925-34. 
16. See Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4. 
17. The “marketplace of ideas” theory has its roots in the philosophy of the 
American Pragmatists, who proposed that truth will become apparent through 
the free exchange of ideas.  See Byron V. Olsen, Rust in the Laboratory:  When Sci-
ence is Censored, 58 ALB. L. REV. 299, 315 n.117 (1994) It was first articulated as a 
key concept in American jurisprudence by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See id. 
18. See generally Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4. 
19. See id. (detailing types of fraud that are common on the Internet); Wire-
less Fraud Criminals Circulate Sensitive Data Via Internet, CTIA Fights Back with In-
ternet E-Mail Hotline, MOBILE PHONE NEWS, Sept. 2, 1996; Jeff Brown, NASD Web 
Site Alerts Investors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 27, 1996, at F1; Jerry Knight, Regulator 
Goes On-Line to Foil Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at F1; Paula Squires, Better 
Business Bureaus to Offer Approval of Web Sites, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 
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rated software,22 and copyright violation23 on the global in-
formation network. 
Two factors have combined to hinder law enforcement 
authorities’ ability to battle Internet crime.  The first of these 
is the international character of the Internet.24 Even the sim-
plest of Internet crimes may involve perpetrators, victims, 
and accessories in several countries, and require a level of in-
ternational law enforcement cooperation formerly reserved 
for such crimes as international terrorism and drug traffick-
ing.25 
The second factor is the ease of concealing one’s identity 
when using the Internet.26 At any given time, twenty to 
twenty-five anonymous remailers—services established and 
maintained for the sole purpose of providing anonymity to 
Internet users27—are active on the Internet.28 While anonym-
                                                                                                                                  
25, 1996, at E1 (indicating that “the Federal Trade Commission has settled about 
two dozen major cases of Internet fraud” and is investigating others). 
20. See generally Clinton Wilder & Bob Violino, Online Theft:  Trade in Black-
Market Data is a Growing Problem for both Business and the Law, INFORMATIONWEEK, 
Aug. 28, 1995, at 30. 
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
22. See Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30; Teddy C. Kim, Taming the Elec-
tronic Frontier:  Software Copyright Protection in the Wake of United States v. 
LaMacchia, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1255, 1268-71 (1996); Andrea Sloan Pink, Copyright 
Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift:  Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 587, 604-05 (1995). 
23. Id.; see also infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing the dis-
pute between the Church of Scientology and Johan Helsingius). 
24. See Marc S. Friedman & Kenneth R. Buys, ‘Infojacking’:  Crimes on the In-
formation Superhighway, COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1996, at 1 (noting that “distance be-
tween the parties [on the Internet] is irrelevant—it is as easy for a Manhattanite 
to communicate with a Parisian as [with] someone in Brooklyn”). 
25. See generally Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4 (quoting 
several securities enforcement and police sources as saying that the structure of 
the Internet and the ease of international access complicates law enforcement). 
26. See generally Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy and Account-
ability:  Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995); 
Long, supra note 15. 
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (defining anonymous remailers). 
28. See Peter H. Lewis, Anonymous Spoof Points Up Hazard in Information 
Highway, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 2, 1995, at 4D; see also Raph Levien, Re-
mailer List (1996) (visited  Sept. 14, 1996) <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/ 
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ity has legitimate purposes and enjoys a level of constitu-
tional protection under American law,29 it can also greatly 
hinder the ability of law enforcement authorities to deter-
mine the source of illegal materials.30 In addition, anonymity 
poses even greater difficulties to owners of intellectual prop-
erty seeking to assert their rights through civil action.31 
The obstacles to law enforcement posed by anonymous 
remailers are especially apparent in cases where illegal ma-
terials are transmitted via a remailer in a foreign country.32 
In such cases, American law enforcement authorities would 
be unable to locate the source of the contraband without the 
cooperation of the courts in the nation where the remailer is 
located33—assistance which has proved difficult to obtain.34 
When cooperation is obtained, moreover, the results to 
both society and the Internet community can be just as catas-
trophic as when it is not.35 A recent court decision in Fin-
                                                                                                                                  
remailer-list.html> for a frequently-updated list of currently operating anony-
mous remailers. 
29. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing  the benefits of 
anonymous remailers; infra note 223 (discussion of the legal basis for constitu-
tional protection of anonymity). 
30. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 993, 1050-51 (1994) (concluding that anonymous remailers should be 
banned because of the difficulties they impose upon law enforcement agencies). 
31. See id. 
32. See Douglas Lavin, Cyber Dilemma:  As Internet Widens, Free-Speech Debate 
Swirls Round a Finn, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 10, 1995, at 1 (quoting a United States 
Senate staffer as saying that anonymous remailers located in foreign countries 
are “huge potential loopholes” to law enforcement on the Internet). 
33. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 287. 
34. See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text (discussing  the Johan 
Helsingius affair); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Regulation of Computing and In-
formation Technology:  Flood Control on the Information Ocean:  Living with Anonym-
ity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 445 (1996) (noting 
that “to the extent that foreign countries with good Internet connec-
tivity . . . already have more permissive rules, those rules effectively undercut 
the United States’ ability to enforce what rules it has”).  Professor Froomkin’s 
piece is a seminal article which discusses ethical, constitutional, and policy rami-
fications stemming from anonymity and privacy issues in cyberspace. 
35. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text (discussing the conse-
quences of the Helsinki District Court’s decision in Church of Spiritual Tech. v. 
Helsingius.) 
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Finland, directing the operator of an anonymous remailer to 
divulge the identity of one of his customers to the police, re-
sulted in the closing of the remailer service.36 The operator of 
the remailer cited the uncertainty of the legal climate in his 
decision to close the service, stating that the ruling opened 
the possibility that he would have to “spend all his time in 
court” defending his customers’ rights.37 In the current legal 
atmosphere, where the rights of law enforcement agents and 
Internet service providers are equally undefined, law en-
forcement agencies and owners of intellectual property must 
walk a tightrope between failing to assert society’s rights 
under the law and unintended chilling of the beneficial uses 
of the Internet.38 
The majority of legal scholarship concerning the Internet 
thus far has focused upon the constitutional questions posed 
by the flow of information through an entirely new me-
dium.39 This is an important issue which must be resolved in 
 
36. Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Helsingius (Helsinki Dist. Ct., Änestys, J., 
Aug. 22, 1996), published in HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Aug. 23, 1996 (on file with the 
author); see also Peter H. Lewis, Behind an Internet Message Service’s Close, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at D2 (describing the decision of the Helsinki District Court).  
The Finnish Eduskunta (parliament) is also likely to reform Finland’s telecom-
munications law in response to this court decision, and restore the strong protec-
tion of Finnish privacy law over electronic communications.  Interview with Pe-
ter H. Lewis, Staff Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 1996). 
37. Lewis, supra note 36, at D2. 
38. See infra notes 220-46 and accompanying text (discussing practical issues 
in control of Internet anonymity). 
39. For examples of articles dealing with constitutional issues on the Inter-
net, especially those relating to encryption, free speech and anonymity, see Long, 
supra note 15; Branscomb, supra note 26; Hardy, supra note 30; Froomkin, supra 
note 34, Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech?  McIntyre and the Internet, 75 
OR. L. REV. 117 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J. 
ONLINE L., art. 4 (1996) (visited Sept. 14, 1996) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
jol/jol.table.html>; Timothy B. Lennon, The Fourth Amendment’s Prohibitions of 
Encryption Limitation:  Will 1995 Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467 (1994); Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic 
Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (1992); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the 
Key:  Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 
(1995); Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches and Digital Contraband:  The 
Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996). 
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order to determine whether the increasing number of new 
laws and regulations40 imposed upon Internet communica-
tion will pass constitutional muster, and to provide a 
framework within which future measures can be enacted.  
The increasing willingness of national governments to regu-
late the flow of information through cyberspace,41 however, 
necessitates an examination of the practical difficulties law 
enforcement agencies face when trying to trace the perpetra-
tors of electronic crime. 
These difficulties promise to increase.  Already, law en-
forcement agents have often found themselves stymied by 
the twin obstacles of anonymity and international transmis-
sion.42 An even more sinister possibility exists in the future:  
the rise of anonymous remailers established and run, not by 
professors or civil libertarians, but by and for organized 
crime.  Anonymous remailers have already been compared 
 
40. See, e.g., the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), Pub. L. No. 
104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996)).  Preliminary in-
junctions against the enforcement of the CDA have been issued by two Federal 
courts pending determination of the act’s constitutionality.  See Shea v. Reno, 930 
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
Even if the CDA fails to pass constitutional muster, however, it seems inevitable 
that the United States government will pass further measures in an attempt to 
regulate communication on the Internet.  A number of other countries have also 
recently begun to intensify their law enforcement efforts in cyberspace.  See Wil-
liam Boston, Germany Targets Compuserve in Child Porn Probe, REUTER EUR. BUS. 
REP., Dec. 29, 1995 (regarding German anti-pornography measures and their af-
fect on the U.S.-based Compuserve on-line network); Tom Standage, Connected:  
Web Access in a Tangle as Censors Have Their Say:  Singapore Wants to Regulate What 
is Broadcast on the Internet, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Sept. 10, 1996, at 3; James 
Kynge, Electronic Undesirables:  Southeast Asian States are Divided on How to Police 
the Internet, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 9, 1996, at 17; Gary Rodan, Information 
Technology and Political Control in Singapore (visited Nov. 11, 1996) <http:// 
www.nmjc.org/jpri>; Mark Turner, Labyrinth of Laws could Lead to a Net Loss, 
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Jan. 15, 1996, at 11 (mentioning recent measures taken 
by the UK and Germany). 
41. Cyberspace is a popular term for the world of electronic communica-
tions over computer networks.  Hardy, supra note 30 at 994.  The term was 
coined in 1982 by the science fiction author William Gibson and popularized in 
his novel NEUROMANCER 51 (1984). 
42. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing Finnish per-
sonal privacy laws). 
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to offshore banks,43 and at least one commentator has pre-
dicted that the future of anonymous remailer services will 
follow a similar course.44 The recent opening of an Internet 
access provider called “Offshore Information Services” on 
the Caribbean island of Anguilla, which provides anonymity 
and offshore data storage services to its customers, can 
hardly bode well for the future of law enforcement on the In-
ternet.45 
Accordingly, this Note will examine the practical difficul-
ties posed by anonymous remailers to international law en-
forcement.  Part I of this Note outlines the structure of 
anonymous remailers and the arguments for and against 
Internet anonymity.  Part II considers several recent interna-
tional law enforcement incidents, and the example of off-
shore banking, to determine the primary issues which police 
and prosecutors will face in tracing the perpetrators of Inter-
net crime.  Part III of this Note attempts to suggest solutions 
which clarify the rights of law enforcement agencies and 
Internet users, in order to preserve the right to anonymity 
and the free flow of information on the Internet while ena-
bling law enforcement authorities to apprehend offenders 
and prevent the rise of “offshore databases.” Finally, this 
 
43. See Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4; Douglas Lavin, 
Anonymous Service an Internet Loophole:  As Governments Try to Limit Content, 
Global Resistance Grows, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 1995, at 7 (referring to 
anon.penet.fi, an anonymous remailer located in Finland, as “the electronic pub-
lishing equivalent of offshore banking”). 
44. See Daniel Akst, The Cutting Edge:  The Helsinki Incident and the Right to 
Anonymity, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at D1 (offering the prediction that “little 
countries with a hankering for foreign exchange will step up to provide Internet 
secrecy, just as certain Caribbean islands now provide banking secrecy, for a 
fee.”); see also Branscomb, supra note 26, at 1675-76 (predicting that “some nations 
might refuse to [cooperate in law enforcement on the Internet], offering instead a 
national data haven to attract the business of customers desiring to keep all of 
their activities on the global grid unidentified.”); Canute James, Barbados Ties 
Economy to Information Services, J. OF COM., Mar. 20, 1996, at A5 (quoting Barbados 
Trade and Business Minister Phillip Goddard as saying that he wants to make 
Barbados “a center for offshore information services”). 
45. See Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4. 
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Note concludes that an international convention concerning 
law enforcement on the Internet is necessary, and that na-
tional governments can strengthen their legal positions in 
the interim by establishing mutual legal assistance treaties 
(“MLATs”)46 with nations which pose problems to law en-
forcement in cyberspace. 
I. ANONYMOUS REMAILERS:  A TOOL FOR FREEDOM AND 
 CRIME 
The Internet has provided unprecedented ability to 
transmit and receive data internationally.47  In addition, data 
transmission over the Internet can be accomplished with a 
great deal of secrecy and privacy through the use of identity-
concealing devices such as anonymous remailers.48 The ease 
of anonymity on the Internet has been a blessing for political 
dissidents, corporate whistle-blowers, participants in on-line 
therapy groups and others who depend on privacy to ac-
complish their goals in safety.49 Nonetheless, anonymous 
remailers also create problems for law enforcement by mak-
ing it difficult to trace individuals who break the law in cy-
berspace.50 This section will outline the history and capabili-
ties of anonymous remailers, describe their legitimate and 
beneficial uses, and conversely illustrate the ways in which 
anonymous remailers can be used to violate the law. 
A. The Rise of Anonymous Remailers 
By now, the Internet needs little introduction to much of 
 
46. See generally James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to 
Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 405 (1988) (discussing the nature 
and operation of MLATs). 
47. See Businesses Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D4. 
48. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of 
anonymous remailers). 
49. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing beneficial uses 
of anonymity on the Internet). 
50. See infra notes 81-118 and accompanying text (discussing obnoxious, tor-
tious and criminal acts conducted with the aid of anonymous remailers). 
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the public.  From obscure beginnings in the 1960s,51 the In-
ternet has expanded into an amalgam of more than 20,000 
government, corporate, academic, and commercial net-
works52 in 159 countries.53 Recent estimates indicate that 
nearly twenty million users are connected to the Internet.54 
Beginning in the late 1980s, as the Internet grew from a 
closed network primarily used by universities and govern-
ments into a public forum, large numbers of services sprang 
up in cyberspace to meet the needs of the growing popula-
tion of users.55 One of these needs—and one for which a 
large market existed—was anonymity; this need was filled 
by anonymous remailers.56 
An anonymous remailer is essentially a conduit through 
which information is received, stripped of its identity, and 
forwarded to its final destination.57 Electronic mail is sent to 
 
51. The Internet grew out of an experimental project of the Department of 
Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration (“ARPA”), designed to 
provide researchers with direct access to computers at key laboratories and to 
facilitate the transmission of vital national defense communications.  See Shea, 
930 F. Supp. at 925-26. ARPA supplied funds to link computers operated by the 
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-oriented re-
search over dedicated telephone lines.  Id. 
52. A network is a system of interconnected computer systems and termi-
nals.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS, supra note 7, at 
391-92. 
53. See Lewis, supra note 13 at C15. 
54. Long, supra note 15, at 1180; see also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925 (estimating 
that as many as 40 million users were connected to the Internet as of early 1996 
and that as many as 200 million will have access by 1999). 
55. See generally Long, supra note 15, at 1180-85 (outlining the history of the 
Internet, and describing many of the services that have grown up to meet the 
demands of Internet users). 
56. See id. at 1185-86. 
57. Harris, supra note 5, at 5.  The function of anonymous remailers has been 
compared to a device called the “cheesebox,” which was invented during the 
Prohibition era to prevent the tracing of telephone calls.  See L. Detweiler, Internet 
Anonymity FAQ, § 1.6 (compiled May 9, 1993) <ftp://rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/ use-
net/news.answers/net-anonymity> (quoting Phil Karn).  The cheesebox con-
nected two telephone lines on the premises of a third party, usually an unin-
volved business, thus preventing law enforcement authorities from tracing 
bootleggers’ calls.  Id. 
A FAQ file, or Frequently Asked Questions file, is a public file maintained 
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the remailer with forwarding orders.58 Upon receiving the 
information, the remailer removes the source address and 
replaces it with identifying information indicating that the 
source of the mail is a numbered anonymous account.59 Mail 
may be forwarded to a specific address or posted to a “Use-
net newsgroup”—one of the more than 10,000 topical discus-
sion groups that exist on the Internet.60 Replies to messages 
sent via anonymous remailer are often anonymized, creating 
a “double-blind” situation in which a transaction can occur 
where neither party knows the identity of the other.61 
The more sophisticated anonymous remailers contain 
custom features to ensure that forwarded messages remain 
anonymous.62 Many electronic mail services automatically 
append the name or signature file63 of the sender to the bot-
                                                                                                                                  
on the Internet to provide background and useful information in a specific area.  
See Long, supra note 15 at 1182 n.25.  FAQs exist for a wide variety of topics and 
are maintained by Usenet newsgroups as well as private individuals.  Id.  Cur-
rently, two FAQs relating to the issue of anonymous remailers exist on the Inter-
net.  These are the Remailer FAQ (visited Sept. 14, 1996) <http://www. 
well.com/user/abacard/remail.html> and the Internet Anonymity FAQ.  Many 
other FAQs and other World Wide Web sites dealing with anonymity and pri-
vacy issues exist on the Internet and can be found using public Internet search 
utilities. 
58. Harris, supra note 5, at 5. 
59. Id. 
60. Usenet, which is one of the most popular and widely used Internet re-
sources, has been defined as: 
[A] worldwide community of electronic B[ulletin] B[oard] S[ystems] 
that is closely associated with the Internet and the Internet community.  
The messages in Usenet are organized into thousands of topical groups, 
or “Newsgroups” . . . . As a Usenet user, you read and contribute 
(“post”) to your local Usenet site.  Each Usenet site distributes its users’ 
postings to other Usenet sites based on various implicit and explicit 
configuration settings, and in turn receives postings from other sites.  
Usenet traffic typically consists of as much as 30 to 50 [megabytes] of 
messages per day.  Usenet is read and contributed to on a daily basis by 
a total population of millions of people. . . . There is no specific network 
that is the Usenet.  Usenet traffic flows over a wide range of networks, 
including the Internet and dial-up phone links. 
Dern, supra note 3, at 196-97. 
61. Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 38. 
62. Harris, supra note 5, at 5. 
63. A signature file, or “.sig file,” is a file consisting of personal information, 
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tom of all outgoing mail; the operators of a number of 
anonymous remailers have responded to this automatic 
process by devising software that automatically deletes this 
identifying information.64 Some remailers, in addition, allow 
users to specify custom “cutmarks,” which instruct the re-
mailer as to where and what to cut from each forwarded 
message.65 In fact, some remailers introduce a random time 
delay prior to forwarding, so that the recipient of the mes-
sage cannot draw any conclusions about the sender’s loca-
tion from the time the message was originally mailed.66 
The first anonymous remailers appeared in 1988 for the 
convenience of Internet users who wished to post messages 
to certain sensitive Usenet newsgroups, such as 
alt.sexual.abuse. recovery, an on-line support group for sur-
vivors of sexual abuse.67 The first “universal anonymous 
server”—a remailer through which users could post mes-
sages to a variety of newsgroups or send private e-mail—
appeared in September 1992.68 The majority of anonymous 
remailers in use today utilize variations of the software cre-
ated for this original universal server by Carnegie-Mellon 
University research programmer Karl Kleinpaste.69 
                                                                                                                                  
quotations and/or official disclaimers which is appended to the bottom of outgo-
ing messages.  See Judith H. Bernstein, How to Handle Signature Files—Add Mean-
ing, Add Snap, Add Another Message To Your Mail, NET GUIDE, Feb. 1, 1996, at 85. 
64. Harris, supra note 5, at 5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id.; see also Andre Bacard, Remailer FAQ (compiled Apr. 12, 1995) (on file 
with author).  According to Bacard, one of the characteristics of an “ideal” 
anonymous remailer is one that “[h]olds your messages for a RANDOM time be-
fore forwarding them.  This time lag makes it harder for snoops to link a mes-
sage that arrives at, say, 3:00 P.M. with a message that leaves your machine at, 
say, 2:59 P.M.”  Id. 
67. John Byczkowski, Online:  Abuses v. Uses Stirs Anonymous Servers Contro-
versy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 12, 1994, at F10. 
68. Id.; see also Joshua Quittner, E-Mail Anonymity Eases Exchange of Secrets; 
Remailer Helps Protect Identities of Users, EDMONTON J., Jan. 8, 1994, at G2. 
69. Id.  More advanced anonymity is also provided by “cypherpunk” and 
“Mixmaster” remailers.  Mixmaster is the newest generation of anonymous re-
mailer, relying on an encryption and anonymizing program installed in the 
original user’s personal computer.  See Arnoud Engelfriet, Anonymity and Privacy 
on the Internet (visited Sept. 14, 1996) <http://www.stack.urc.tue.nl/ 
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B. The Benefits of Anonymous Remailers 
Anonymous remailers have been staunchly defended by 
many civil-liberties advocates, who contend that public dis-
cussion on the Internet requires the protection of anonymity 
in certain cases.70 For instance, anonymous remailers have 
been used by dissidents in Singapore to criticize the island’s 
government without the risk of harassment or imprison-
ment.71 
Other users of anonymous remailers include participants 
in on-line therapy groups, who often wish to remain 
                                                                                                                                  
~galactus/remailers/index-anon.html>.  Cypherpunk and Mixmaster remailers 
possess a disadvantage as compared to traditional “pseudonymous” remailers, in 
that the additional safeguards inherent in these systems make it impossible to 
reply to messages sent through these remailers.  Id.  Thus, anonymous two-way 
transactions over the Internet generally require the use of a pseudonymous re-
mailer; however, more advanced remailers can be used for defamation, dissemi-
nation of copyrighted material, or “information terrorism.”  See infra notes 94-105 
and accompanying text (discussing methods of using anonymous remailers for 
criminal acts).  Engelfriet’s web site provides detailed information on the current 
state of anonymity and privacy technology on the Internet, and offers links to 
other anonymity-related sites. 
70. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic 
Frontiers Foundation have indicated that they will join anonymous-remailer op-
erator Sameer Parekh and New York journalist Jonathan Wallace in challenging a 
recently enacted Georgia statute criminalizing the misrepresentation of identity 
on-line.  Art Kramer & Elizabeth Lee, On-Line Anonymity Lawsuit in Georgia Gets 
Extra Support, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 4, 1996, at 7C; Georgia Computer Systems 
Protection Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90 through 16-9-94 (1996). 
Discussions of the right to anonymity on the Internet are often couched in 
terms of civil liberties.  See Detweiler, supra note 57, § 5.4 (quoting Stuart P. 
Derby as saying that “[t]hree of our [the U.S.’s] founding fathers, Madison, Ham-
ilton, and Jay, seemed to think ‘anonymous posting’ was OK.  The Federalist pa-
pers [sic] were originally printed in New York newspapers with authorship at-
tributed to ‘Publius.’”).  Derby went on to speculate as to whether critics of 
Internet anonymity, such as the individual to whom he was replying, would find 
the Founding Fathers’ purposes “legitimate.”  Id.  But see McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Comm’n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1537 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
anonymity, although justifiable under extraordinary circumstances, is essentially 
dishonorable and undeserving of constitutional protection in that it “facilitates 
wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the 
anonymity”). 
71. See Lavin, supra note 32, at 1; see also Standage, supra note 40, at 3 (dis-
cussing attempts by the government of Singapore to censor speech on the Inter-
net). 
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anonymous while discussing sensitive personal issues in a 
public forum.72 Participants in sexual discussion groups, 
which include many groups devoted to socially disapproved 
practices, also use anonymous remailers on a regular basis to 
prevent their sexual habits from becoming public knowl-
edge.73 Anonymity may be especially important to users 
who are public figures in their own right, and do not wish 
their psychological problems or sexual proclivities to be-
come grist for the media.74 
Privacy may be necessary for other reasons as well.  Us-
ers of anonymous remailers include professionals who do 
not wish to be deluged with requests for free advice,75 job-
seekers who do not want their current employers to know 
that they are seeking work elsewhere,76 corporate and gov-
ernment whistle-blowers who fear retaliation should their 
 
72. Steve Harris, Internet:  Care in the Virtual Community:  It’s Easy to Find 
Social Support in Cyberspace, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 16, 1995, at 4. 
73. See Kenneth Li, Where Nobody Knows Your Name, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 15, 
1995, Educ. Supp., at 28; see also Akst, supra note 39, at 1.  An unidentified Ala-
bama woman has been quoted as stating that: 
I consider myself to be a fairly good example of why anonymous re-
mailers are needed on the Net. . . . To be blunt, I am a bisexual, a per-
vert and a witch.  I also live in Alabama, where at least two of the three 
are illegal.  In a worst-case scenario, I could lose my job, have my career 
ruined, face prosecution and possibly even have to deal with violence. 
Id.  In addition, according to one court: 
Anonymity is important to Internet users who seek to access sensitive 
information, such as users of the Critical Path AIDS Project’s Web site, 
the users, particularly gay youth, of Queer Resources Directory, and us-
ers of Stop Prisoner Rape (SPR).  Many members of SPR’s mailing list 
have asked to remain anonymous due to the stigma of prisoner rape. 
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
74. Li, supra note 72, at 28.  Li explains:  “[l]et’s say you wanted to post a 
message to alt.transgender . . . and let’s say . . . you were a congressman.  Cer-
tainly, you wouldn’t want your constituents, and certainly not the voters, to be 
aware of some of your idiosyncratic hobbies . . . .”  Id. 
75. Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 16.  Professor 
Froomkin states that he has “posted messages to newsgroups and received a 
great deal of unwanted e-mail in reply because my e-mail signature identifies me 
as a law professor.  One way to avoid getting requests for free legal advice is to 
delete the signature and route comments through a remailer.”  Id. 
76. Bacard, supra note 66. 
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names become known,77 refugees who fear retaliation 
against themselves or their families at home,78 and partici-
pants in on-line dating services who prefer to remain 
anonymous during the initial stages of correspondence in 
order to minimize the risk of being victimized by a stalker.79 
Some Internet commentators have also recommended the 
use of anonymous remailers as a protection against receipt 
of unsolicited commercial e-mail.80 
C. The Dangers of Anonymity in Cyberspace 
Anonymous remailers, however, also have other, less le-
gitimate uses, ranging from the annoying to the criminal.  
Anonymous remailers are often used for “spamming,” 
which is excessive and unwanted advertising in inappropri-
ate Internet forums.81 Many Internet users have commented 
further on the high incidence of “trolling”—that is, public 
baiting of other users—by holders of anonymous accounts.82 
 
77. See Peter H. Lewis, Is Computer Anonymity a Constitutional Right?, STATE 
J.-REG., Dec. 31, 1994, at 10. 
78. Steve Harris, E-Mail:  Secret Service:  Steve Harris on the Clash Between 
Anonymity and Accountability on the Internet, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 2, 1995, at 
7 (quoting physicist Dr. Bruce Scott as saying that “for many Iranians, an 
anonymous remailer of some sort is the only way they can contact their relatives 
and friends at all, since the mere appearance of their names is dangerous to their 
lives.”). 
79. Id. 
80. Steve Creedy, Internet Spawning Spammers:  Unsolicited E-Mail a By-
Product of On-Line Commercialization, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 28, 1996, at C3. 
This article notes that many originators of commercial e-mail compile mailing 
lists by noting the e-mail addresses of Usenet posters.  See id.  Posting to Usenet 
anonymously is recommended as a means of insuring that on-line solicitors are 
unable to ascertain the user’s actual e-mail address.  Id. 
81. Steve Harris, Internet:  A Plague that Travels by Post:  Easy to Do and Often 
Tricky to Trace, Spamming is Sweeping the Net, GUARDIAN (LONDON), July 6, 1995, at 
4. 
82. See Detweiler, supra note 57, § 1.5 (citing the example of “a poster [who] 
might describe ways of attacking cats on the cat-lovers group . . . these messages 
appeared long before the [anonymous remailer] services . . . but the servers tend 
to make it easier and almost encourage it. . . .”); see also id. § 2.1 (quoting Klein-
paste as saying that “even as restricted as it was, my system was subjected to 
abuses to the point where it was ordered dismantled by the facilities staff. . . . 
Such abuses started right after it was created”). 
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Although the individuals who publish such messages are a 
small minority of anonymous-remailer users,83 their pres-
ence has been significant and troubling enough to draw con-
siderable attention from the Internet community.84 In addi-
tion, a number of Internet hoaxes—such as the 
announcement, distributed in 1994 in the guise of an Associ-
ated Press news release, that Microsoft Corporation had ac-
quired the Roman Catholic Church “in exchange for an un-
specified number of shares of Microsoft common stock”—
have also been transmitted via anonymous remailers.85 
On a more sinister level, anonymous remailers can be 
used to harass or threaten other members of the on-line 
community without fear of retaliation.86 Kleinpaste, the crea-
tor of the original universal anonymous server, shut his ser-
vice down less than nine weeks after he opened it to the 
public.87 This was in response to a rash of incidents, includ-
ing a user who posted vulgar materials to Usenet news-
groups aimed at children and another who attempted to 
blackmail his former girlfriend by threatening to sell porno-
 
83. See id. § 5.5 (quoting Helsingius as saying that:  “[t]he latest statistics 
from the service show 18203 registered users, 3500 messages per day on the av-
erage . . . . I have received complaints involving postings from 57 anonymous 
users, and, of these, been forced to block only 8 users who continued their abuse 
despite a warning from me. . . .”). 
84. See generally id. §§ 5.6, 6.1. 
85. Peter H. Lewis, Anonymous Spoof Points Up Hazard in Information High-
way, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 2, 1995, at D4. 
86. See Detweiler, supra note 57, § 2.3. Detweiler quotes a letter in opposition 
to anonymity by an unidentified Internet user, who argues that he is: 
[A] firm believer in privacy, but that is not the same thing as anonym-
ity.  Anonymity can be used to violate another’s privacy.  For instance, 
in recent years, I have had harassing anonymous notes and phone calls 
threatening XXX because of things I have said on the net . . . . I have 
seen neighbors and friends come under great suspicion and hardship 
because of anonymous notes claiming they used drugs or abused chil-
dren.  I have seen too many historical accounts of witch-hunts, secret 
tribunals, and pogroms—all based on anonymous accusations.  I am in 
favor of defeating the reasons people need anonymity, not giving the 
wrong-doers another mechanism to use to harass others. 
Id. 
87. Byczkowski, supra note 67, at F10. 
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graphic pictures of her over the Internet.88 Anonymous 
threats to the President of the United States have also been 
received via electronic mail.89 In addition, anonymous re-
mailers are also used regularly to post bigoted or hate-filled 
messages to Usenet newsgroups.90 
Electronic vandalism, or on-line activities which damage 
or disrupt the flow of information over the Internet, is an-
other common practice among anonymous Internet users.91 
Through a practice known as “pinging,” users may tempo-
rarily disable an Internet address by bombarding it with 
thousands of messages.92 This practice, also known as “mail 
bombing,” temporarily disabled the Pipeline Internet access 
provider in New York City in November 1994.93 
The greatest threats to law enforcement stemming from 
Internet anonymity, however, are large-scale data theft and 
financial crime,94 copyright infringement,95 international 
trafficking in pornography,96 and “information terrorism.”97 
 
88. Id. 
89. Lewis, supra note 77, at 10. 
90. A recent spot check of the Usenet newsgroup soc.culture.jewish, for ex-
ample, taken before the closing of anon.penet.fi, revealed that more than 20 per-
cent of anti-Semitic messages posted to the newsgroup were posted through 
anonymous remailers.  Search of soc.culture.jewish, Usenet newsgroup (May 12, 
1996).  A similar percentage of racist messages on soc.culture.african.american 
had been anonymized prior to being posted on the newsgroup.  Search of 
soc.culture.african-american, Usenet newsgroup (May 12, 1996).  A common 
complaint in many ethnic newsgroups, in the words of soc.culture.israel poster 
Roger Froikin, is that “the haters lack the guts to use their real names.”  See also 
Detweiler, supra note 57, § 5.6 (quoting various Internet users who describe “vi-
ciously offensive and scatological anti-Arab posts . . . in talk.politics.mideast” 
and “a rise in KTF (‘Kill the Fags’) in alt.sex from anonymous postings, as well as 
KTJ postings in soc.culture.jewish.”) 
91. Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30. 
92. Id. 
93. Lewis, supra note 77, at 10. 
94. Id. 
95. See id.; see also infra note 135 (discussing the Church of Scientology’s on-
line intellectual property disputes). 
96. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of 
child pornography on the Internet). 
97. See Paul A. Strassmann & William Marlow, Risk-Free Access Into The 
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Federal law enforcement estimates indicate that more than 
$10 billion in data is stolen annually in the United States.98 In 
addition to pirated software and other copyrighted materi-
als, stolen data includes credit-card and calling card num-
bers, and corporate trade secrets.99 
Through the use of anonymous remailers, traders in sto-
len data are able to conceal both their identities and those of 
their customers.100 Illegal data exchanges have sprung up on 
a number of Usenet newsgroups.101 Typically, a transaction 
in stolen data begins with an anonymously posted message 
offering the contraband for sale.102 Interested customers re-
spond with encrypted messages indicating their interest in 
purchasing the data, following which the transaction “goes 
black”—that is, completely anonymous.103 In one exception-
ally large instance of data theft, MCI technician Ivy James 
Lay pled guilty in January 1995 on charges of selling more 
                                                                                                                                  
Global Information Infrastructure Via Anonymous Re-Mailers, Harvard University, 
Kennedy School of Government, Symposium on the Global Information Infrastruc-
ture:  Information, Policy & International Infrastructure (Jan. 28-30, 1996) (visited 
Nov. 16, 1996) <http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/anon-remail.html>.  
Strassmann and Marlow argue that the global government, financial, and tele-
communications information infrastructure is vulnerable to disruption from 
computer-based assaults.  Id.  Strassmann is a member of the faculty of the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point; Marlow is a senior vice president at Science 
Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”).  Id. 
 Anonymous remailers have also been used to disseminate instructions on 
commission of more traditional acts of terrorism.  See Hearing on Terrorism, Tech-
nology and Government, before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1995) (testimony of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Asst. Atty. General) (indicating that 
information regarding bomb construction had been disseminated via an anony-
mous remailer after the Oklahoma City bombing). 
98. Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30. 
99. Id.; see also Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 49 
(arguing that protection of intellectual property faces a great threat from ano-
nymity on the Internet).  Professor Froomkin cites the example of the recent dis-
closure on the Internet of the source code to a proprietary unpatented algorithm.  
Id.  (“The proprietary value of that trade secret is now much less than it was a 
few months ago . . . .”). 
100. Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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than 60,000 calling card and credit-card numbers under the 
cover of anonymity.104 Lay, known in cyberspace as the 
“Knight Shadow,” sold the stolen credit card numbers to end 
users in a number of European countries with the aid of a 
Spanish co-conspirator.105 
Trafficking in pornography is also greatly facilitated by 
the use of anonymous remailers.106 Dealers in child pornog-
raphy often route their merchandise through anonymous 
remailers located in countries where child pornography is 
legal,107 or where anti-pornography statutes have not yet ex-
panded to cover electronic media.108 Identity can be further 
 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Arthur, supra note 9, at 13. 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1989) (de-
fendant Moncini challenged his conviction for mailing child pornography from 
Italy to California on the grounds that distribution of child pornography was le-
gal in Italy).  A number of other countries have also not yet criminalized sale, 
possession or distribution of child pornography.  See Swedish Monarch, Nobel Lau-
reates Urge War on Scourge of Child Abuse, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 31, 
1996 (sale and possession of child pornography legal in Sweden); Thomas Sanc-
ton, Preying on the Young, TIME, Sept. 2, 1996, at 22 (possession legal in Mexico); 
Angeline Oyog, Cybercops Wanted to Police Information Highway, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Aug. 30, 1996 (child pornography tolerated in Thailand).  In many cases, 
the legality of child pornography in any given country is complicated by varia-
tions in the age of consent.  Id.  A recent study by Kathleen Mahoney of the Uni-
versity of Canada and Laura Lederer of the University of Minnesota, which sur-
veyed child pornography laws in 162 countries, indicated that “the Philippines 
has all the right laws on the books, but the age of majority is 12.”  Id.; see also 
Roger J.R. Levesque, Sexual Use, Abuse and Exploitation of Children:  Challenges in 
Implementing Children’s Human Rights, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 986 n.141 (1994) (re-
garding age of consent as an issue in determining the legality of child pornogra-
phy). 
108. Arthur, supra note 9, at 13.  A number of jurisdictions inside and out-
side the United States have thus far failed to modernize their child pornography 
statutes to include materials created or disseminated via electronic media.  An 
instructive example is provided by Article 263 of the New York State Penal Law, 
which punishes the production, dissemination, purchase or possession of a “sex-
ual performance” by a child.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00-.16.  A “performance” 
is defined as “any play, motion picture, photograph or dance,” and additionally 
as “any other visual representation exhibited before an audience.”  N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 263.00(4).  Any of the materials specifically listed in the statute is prohib-
ited in New York, regardless of whether it is exhibited before an audience.  Peo-
ple v. Gaito, 199 A.D.2d 615 (N.Y. App. Div.), app. denied, 83 N.Y.2d 805 (1993).  
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disguised, making the task of law enforcement officials even 
more difficult, by routing pornographic materials through a 
series of anonymous remailers.109 In a related area of crimi-
nal activity, sexual predators may disguise their identity by 
means of anonymous remailers when communicating with 
underage victims via the Internet.110 
An additional hazard to law enforcement may develop 
with the growth of “digital cash” or “e-cash.”111 Anonymous 
transmission of digital cash would greatly facilitate money-
laundering, and might allow untraceable blackmail or even 
demands for ransom.112 
                                                                                                                                  
However, materials not specifically listed in the statute—such as computer-
generated images—must be shown before an audience in order to constitute a 
prohibited “performance” under the Penal Law.  This gap in the Penal Law’s 
protection against child pornography is especially problematic in cases where an 
image was altered or partially generated in the computer itself rather than being 
simply a digital representation of a photograph or motion picture. 
109. Arthur, supra note 9, at 13.  Id.; see also Peter H. Lewis, Computer Jokes 
and Threats Ignite Debate on Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at A5 (indicat-
ing that messages mailed through multiple anonymous remailers can be re-
mailed in a random sequence different from the order in which they arrive, mak-
ing it impossible to trace messages by matching the routes taken by incoming 
and outgoing information); Dave Mandl, Life After Penet:  The Remailer is Dead, 
Long Live the Remailer, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 8, 1996, at 23 (noting that an Oakland-
based service, Community ConneXion, offers an interface that allows sending of 
anonymous E-mail through a chain of up to 10 remailers with the push of a but-
ton); Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at pars. 22-25 (describ-
ing a process by which a message can be sent through a “chain” of anonymous 
remailers).  The preservation of anonymity can be greatly facilitated if one of the 
remailers in the chain “either erases [the original sender’s] logs or is out-
side . . . [the] jurisdiction” of the judge in whose court disclosure of the sender’s 
identity is sought.  Id. at par. 25. 
110. See Friedman & Buys, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that a hypothetical 
child victim communicating with an anonymous predator “has no way of know-
ing that his or her e-mail ‘friend’ is really a convicted child abuser in the next 
town”).  A number of pedophiles have gained access to minors by presenting 
themselves as minors on the Internet; in at least one case, a Florida man was ar-
rested for kidnapping after he befriended a 13-year-old Chicago boy over the 
Internet, arranged a meeting, and brought the child to Louisville, Kentucky by 
bus.  See id. at 14-15. 
111. Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 41. 
112. Id. at par. 46.  Professor Froomkin describes a hypothetical kidnapping 
where: 
[I]nstead of demanding small unmarked bills, the extortionist demands 
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Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of Internet 
anonymity, however, is the possibility of “information ter-
rorism” against national governments or corporations.113 In 
developed nations, which are increasingly dependent upon 
information networks for crucial government and public 
utility functions, information-based assaults upon govern-
ment, financial, power generation, or telecommunications 
computer systems have the potential for massive disrup-
tion.114 If such an attack is conducted via anonymous remail-
ers, the risk to the perpetrator is minimal.115 
Law enforcement officials admit that they “are playing 
catch-up” in their efforts to combat electronic crime commit-
ted under cover of anonymity.116 American authorities, 
however, may obtain court orders directing a remailer to re-
veal the source address of illegal materials that have been 
transmitted via an anonymous remailer located in the 
United States.117 In cases where electronic contraband travels 
through one or more foreign countries before reaching its 
destination, though, the law enforcement agencies’ task is 
often increased by orders of magnitude.118 
                                                                                                                                  
that the victims publish the digital signatures of a large quantity of e-
cash in a newspaper.  Because the payoff occurs via publication in a 
broadcast medium such as a newspaper [or] a Usenet group, the extor-
tionist faces no danger of being captured while attempting to pick up 
the ransom.  And because the e-cash is untraceable, the extortionist is 
able to spend it without fear of marked bills, recorded serial numbers, 
or other forms of detection. 
Id. 
113. Strassmann & Marlow, supra note 97. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30. 
117. See Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 15. 
118. See Peter J. Vassalo, The New Ivan the Terrible:  Problems in International 
Criminal Enforcement and the Specter of the Russian Mafia, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
173, 188-90 (1996) (discussing the difficult and time-consuming nature of tradi-
tional international criminal law enforcement). 
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II. A CASE IN POINT:  L’AFFAIRE HELSINGIUS AND 
 INTERNATIONAL  LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CYBERSPACE 
The difficulties of enforcing the law in an environment in 
which anonymity can be freely obtained is illustrated by 
several recent incidents involving stolen intellectual prop-
erty.  In these incidents, disputed intellectual property was 
published throughout the Internet by means of anonymous 
remailers.  The most illustrative of these, and the incident 
with the most far-reaching effects, occurred recently in Hel-
sinki, where Finnish police were persuaded to raid the of-
fices of a local remailer operator in search of the identity of 
an alleged copyright violator.119 The ramifications of the 
Helsinki incident, which are outlined below, are a graphic 
demonstration of the issues and balancing tests which face 
law enforcement agencies on the Internet and point up a 
comparison with another recent and growing international 
law enforcement problem—offshore banking.120 This part 
discusses these ramifications, and describes measures taken 
in the regulation of offshore banking that may be of use in 
combating the similar problems posed by anonymity on the 
Internet. 
A. A Dispute in Finland 
Until recently, the world’s largest anonymous remailer, 
anon.penet.fi,121 operated in Helsinki, Finland.122 
 
119. See Lavin, supra note 32, at 1; see also infra notes 134-42 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Helsingius affair). 
120. A comprehensive discussion of offshore banking is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  This Note will outline, in general terms, the issue of offshore banking 
and its analogies to the environment of the Internet, and describe measures taken 
to control offshore banking which might be adaptable to cyberspace.  Readers 
are referred to the articles cited in this section for a more complete discussion of 
issues in international banking regulation. 
121. An Internet address such as anon.penet.fi consists of a “user name” and 
a “domain name.”  The “user name” is an identifier unique to a particular user, 
while a “domain name” is assigned to a particular computer or set of computers.  
Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 933.  “Anon” is thus the user name assigned to the 
anonymous remailer service on the penet.fi computer network.  The suffix “fi” 
indicates that the penet network operates in Finland.  Each nation other than the 
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Anon.penet.fi, which processed and forwarded more than 
8,000 messages each day,123 contained more than 500,000 ac-
tive accounts.124 Approximately seventy-five percent of those 
accounts originated in the United States.125 The proprietor of 
the remailer, Johan Helsingius, is the managing director and 
part owner of a Finnish Internet access provider, and a civil 
libertarian who operated anon.penet.fi as a labor of love.126 
Finland is an ideal location for an anonymous remailer 
for several reasons.  Finland leads the world in the number 
of Internet connections per capita, and contains the world’s 
most comprehensive and sophisticated network of Internet 
access providers.127 In addition, Finnish law includes strin-
gent protections of personal privacy, including a constitu-
tional provision which specifically protects the security of 
                                                                                                                                  
United States has a distinctive identifying suffix which is attached to the domain 
names of its computer networks.  Internet addresses additionally contain names 
or numbers identifying particular accounts.  On anon.penet.fi, these account 
identifiers take the form anXXXXXX@anon.penet.fi.  A numbered account on 
anon.penet.fi might be identified, for example, as an244354@anon.penet.fi. 
122. Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
123. Mandl, supra note 109, at 24. 
124. Engelfriet, supra note 69. 
125. Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
126. Joshua Quittner, Worldwide Anonymous Remailer Service Keeps Freedom of 
Expression On-Line, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 6, 1994, at 1G.  Helsingius, the proprietor 
of the Oy Penetic Ab Internet access service in Helsinki, credits his commitment 
to on-line anonymity to his sensitivity “to the plight of political minorities; his 
parents, he explained, are part of Finland’s Swedish-speaking minority.”  Id.; see 
also Bacard, supra note 66.  Bacard quotes Helsingius as saying: 
Living in Finland, I got a pretty close view of how things were in the 
former Soviet Union.  If you actually owned a photocopier or even a 
typewriter there you would have to register it and they would take 
samples of what your typewriter would put out so they could identify it 
later.  That’s something I find so appalling.  The fact that you have to 
register every means of providing information to the public sort of par-
allels it, like saying you have to sign everything on the Net.  We always 
have to be able to track you down. 
Id. 
127. Marc Ferranti, Merita, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 9, 1996, at 36.  Finland 
has 24 people per Internet access server, compared to 59 per access point in the 
second and third ranking nations, Sweden and Australia.  Id.  In Finland, a na-
tion of five million people, some 90,000 homes have access to the Internet.  
Katharine Stalter, Scandinavia Wired for Growth, VARIETY, Sept. 2, 1996, at 64. 
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confidential mail and telephone messages,128 and laws en-
suring that private communications and records in Finland 
will remain secure.129 In fact, Finland’s shield of personal 
privacy law has been breached on only one occasion.130 
Anon.penet.fi weathered a number of scandals in its four 
years of operation.  Detractors of Helsingius’ service have 
“mailbombed” it on a number of occasions, disabling the 
service for hours or days.131 In February 1995, a Swedish 
newspaper charged that pornographic pictures of children 
were being transmitted through anon.penet.fi.132 Although 
 
128. The Finnish Constitution Act of 1919 provides that “[t]he secrecy of 
postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication shall be inviolable, except 
when otherwise provided by law.”  Constitution Act of 1919, art. 12 (Fin.).  The 
Constitution Act of 1919 remains the current constitution of Finland.  Interview 
with Nicholas Hill, Department of Scandinavian Studies, University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison (Nov. 5, 1996). 
129. The Personal Data File Act of 1987, for instance, forbids the collection, 
maintenance or disclosure of personal information without the consent of the 
person concerning whom records are maintained.  See Personal Data File Act at 
§ 18 (Fin. 1987).  In general, disclosure of records is only possible under court or-
der and under circumstances defined by statute.  In addition, section 38(8) of the 
Finnish Criminal Code provides that unlawful opening of a sealed communica-
tion or unlawful interception of a telegram or telephone call is a criminal offense 
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year.  Article 38(9a) of the Criminal 
Code further provides that the proprietor or employee of a telephone, radio, or 
telegraph service who unlawfully discloses the contents of communications or 
confidential information about his customers as provided in Article 40 of the 
Criminal Code may be imprisoned for up to two years.  See Criminal Code, art. 
38(9a), 40(15), 40(19a) (Fin.); see also Antti Suviranta, Worker Privacy in Finland, 17 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 45, 45-46 (1995) (explaining that Finlanders are “traditionally re-
garded as valuing their privacy” and that the Finnish privacy laws have recently 
been made more stringent in response to the implementation of a national identi-
fication system); Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
130. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (describing the February 
1995 Finnish police raid on the offices of anon.penet.fi.).  It should be noted, 
however, that Helsingius is reported to have revealed the identity of a customer 
on one other occasion, in response to an ongoing American investigation of an 
alleged stalking incident.  Thom Stark, A Fine and Private Net:  Anonymous Re-
mailers Ensure Freedom of Thought, Dialogue, LAN TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at 104. 
131. Quittner, supra note 126, at 1G. “Mailbombing” is a common electronic 
vandalism practice wherein the target computer is deluged with electronic mail, 
causing the system to overload.  Wilder & Violino, supra note 20, at 30. 
132. See Harris, supra note 78, at 7 (referring to an article in the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter); see also Strassman & Marlow, supra note 97 (claim-
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the stories ultimately proved unfounded, they contributed to 
an atmosphere of suspicion that led to the breach of the ser-
vice’s secrecy by Finnish police later that month.133 
The dispute, which led to a Finnish police raid on 
Helsingius’ headquarters, stemmed from a long-running 
quarrel between the Church of Scientology and an estranged 
member, Dennis Erlich.134 The Church of Scientology had 
frequently engaged in intellectual property disputes on the 
Internet and elsewhere, having accused former members of 
illegally distributing Church material on a number of occa-
sions.135 Scientologists have also released programs, known 
                                                                                                                                  
ing that anon.penet.fi “is frequently used by the Russian (ex-KGB) criminal ele-
ment”). 
133. Harris, supra note 78, at 7. 
134. Id. 
135. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16398 (9th Cir. 
1996); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1992); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1995); Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission 
of the Church of Scientology, 614 F. Supp. 500 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).  The Religious 
Technology Center is the arm of the Church of Scientology responsible for pro-
tecting the Church’s intellectual property.  Lewis, supra note 36, at D2.  The 
chairman of the Religious Technology Center’s board of directors is David Mis-
cavige, who is also the head of the Church of Scientology.  See Robert Vaughn 
Young, Scientology from Inside Out, QUILL, Nov. 1993, at 38. 
 Lerma, Netcom, and F.A.C.T.NET are related cases, stemming from a long-
running Internet copyright dispute involving works of the late L. Ron Hubbard, 
the founder of the Church of Scientology. See Alison Frankel, Making Law, Making 
Enemies, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 68.  These writings, known as the “Operating 
Thetans” or “Advanced Technology,” were written by Hubbard during the pe-
riod 1966-86, and were kept secret by his orders.  Id.  Portions of these writings, 
some of which had previously entered into the record of a California court case, 
were posted on the Internet by Erlich and Arnaldo Lerma, both ex-Scientologists 
and members of the board of F.A.C.T.NET, an anti-brainwashing organization.  
See id. 
 The Netcom case, involving a major California Internet access provider, is es-
pecially noteworthy, because Erlich was a co-defendant and because the Netcom 
court established the principle that an Internet access provider was not exempt 
from liability for copyright infringement as a “common carrier.”  Netcom, 907 F.  
Supp. at 1370.  Thus, an Internet access service, including an anonymous re-
mailer, may currently be held liable as a republisher for copyright violations or 
defamatory statements transmitted by its users.  See id. at 1370, n.12; see also Strat-
ton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) 
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as “cancelbunnies” or “cancelbots,” which seek out and de-
lete on-line messages critical of the Church.136 
In January 1995, anon.penet.fi became involved in the 
dispute between the Church of Scientology and Erlich, a 
former Scientology minister who had become an ardent op-
ponent of Scientology after leaving the Church.137 Erlich 
posted excerpts from the Church’s sacred texts on a Usenet 
newsgroup, alt.religion.scientology, in order to highlight 
those aspects of the Church’s teachings which he perceived 
to be absurd.138 
On February 2, 1995, the Church of Scientology filed a 
complaint through Interpol with the Finnish police, charging 
that sacred texts, which the Church claimed were protected 
by copyright, had been stolen from the Church and transmit-
ted through anon.penet.fi.139 In the climate of suspicion 
which followed the Swedish newspaper accounts, the 
Church of Scientology was able to secure a search warrant 
from the Finnish courts.140 
The Finnish authorities offered Helsingius a choice be-
                                                                                                                                  
(holding that an Internet access service may be held liable for defamatory state-
ments on the part of its users). 
 The Church of Scientology has engaged in numerous other on-line copyright 
disputes, in one case attempting to shut down an entire Usenet newsgroup, 
alt.religion.scientology, by asserting an intellectual property right to the word 
“Scientology.”  Frankel, supra, at 68.  Another on-line critic of the Church of Sci-
entology, known as “Scamizdat,” has thus far eluded detection through the use 
of a series of anonymous remailers.  Kim, supra note 22, at 1267 n.59. 
136. See Jim McClellan, Cyberspace:  Law of the Wires:  Jim McClellan on an 
Almighty Row Over Net, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 1, 1995, at 6. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. See Andrew Brown, Row Lifts Lid on Computer Giving User Anonymity, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at 10.  The Church of Scientology was able to 
file its Interpol complaint through the FBI.  Flash Point 8 Finland⎯Identity Papers 
on the Internet, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY BULL., Jan. 1, 1996.  At least one 
commentator has speculated that the Church of Scientology was able to obtain 
the assistance of the FBI because FBI director Louis Freeh favors an outright ban 
on anonymous remailers.  Id.; see also Gary Chapman, Net Gain, NEW REPUBLIC, 
July 31, 1995, at 10 (stating that Freeh wants to outlaw anonymous remailers). 
140. Harris, supra note 78, at 7. 
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tween revealing the source of the disputed messages or con-
fiscation of his computer, which contained a comprehensive 
list of the source addresses for the 200,000 accounts then ac-
tive on anon.penet.fi.141 Rather than sacrifice the anonymity 
of his entire clientele, Helsingius released Erlich’s identity to 
Finnish police, who passed the information on to the Church 
of Scientology.142 
The raid on anon.penet.fi had hardly been completed 
when the Finnish police announced that they had made a 
mistake.143 Finnish authorities stated that the national police 
department had been led to believe that a crime had oc-
curred in Finland, but that Helsingius’ service was actually a 
passive conduit through which material illegal in the United 
States had been distributed.144 Under Finnish law, a search 
warrant cannot be obtained unless a crime has been commit-
ted in Finland.145 Following the incident, the Finnish police 
promised to be more circumspect in piercing the privacy of 
anonymous remailers in the future.146 
This incident, however, was not the end of the 
anon.penet.fi dispute.  The Church of Scientology pursued a 
complaint against Helsingius in the Finnish courts, in con-
nection with two other alleged copyright violators.147 On 
 
141. Id. 
142. See id. 
143. Lavin, supra note 32, at 1 (quoting Finnish Det. Sgt. Kaj Malmberg as 
stating that “we [the Finnish national police] really feel that we were being 
used”). 
144. Id. 
145. See id. 
146. Id.  According to the Finnish police, “we are not going to just rush into 
someone’s home on the basis of a complaint.  It has to be a real crime.”  Id. 
147. See Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Helsingius (Helsinki Dist. Ct., Änestys, 
J., Aug. 22, 1996), at 2.  The Church of Scientology sought the identity of the 
holders of the accounts identified as an498608@anon.penet.fi and 
an545430@anon.penet.fi.  Id.  The primary plaintiff, the Church of Spiritual Tech-
nology, is a Scientology-affiliated organization which functions as the archivist 
for the works of L. Ron Hubbard.  See Robert W. Welkos & Joel Sappell, The Mind 
Behind the Religion:  Church Scriptures Get High-Tech Protection, L.A. TIMES, June 
24, 1990, at A40.  The Religious Technology Center and New Era Publications 
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August 22, 1996, the Helsinki District Court ruled that the 
Finnish personal privacy law did not protect electronic 
mail.148 The court rejected Helsingius’ analogies of his 
anonymous remailer service to protected trade secrets,149 
mass media,150 protected telecommunications,151 and mail,152 
holding that the provisions of Finland’s Code of Court Op-
erations required disclosure of the identities sought by the 
Church of Scientology.153 The ruling of the District Court, 
                                                                                                                                  
International, a Danish publisher connected to the Church of Scientology, were 
co-plaintiffs.  Helsingius at 1.  The complainant officially seeking the order for 
disclosure was Finnish Criminal Police Inspector Harri Pulkkinen.  Id. 
148. Id. at 4; see also Lewis, supra note 36, at D2. 
149. Helsingius at 2-3.  The legal definition of business or trade secrets in 
Finland has been read broadly to include customer lists such as Helsingius’ cus-
tomer file.  Id.  Nonetheless, the court found that the protection of trade secrets in 
Finland was primarily intended to prevent economic loss, and that there would 
be no economic loss to Helsingius from disclosure as he did not charge for the 
use of his service.  Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). 
150. Id. at 3.  Helsingius argued that the Finnish Constitution Act’s protec-
tion of freedom of speech, combined with § 17(24) of the Finnish Code of Court 
Procedure (shielding the identity of mass media sources) protected the secrecy of 
his customer file.  Id.  However, the court held that “one could not legally draw a 
parallel [between the Internet and] mass media,” because there is no individual 
on the Internet with editorial responsibility “who one could place in the place of 
the real writer” to answer for criminal or tortious material.  Id. 
151. Id.  The court found that the provisions of Government Bill 309/93 (re-
vising the Constitution Act of 1919) provided that the secrecy of confidential 
telecommunications may in some instances be subordinated to the needs of law 
enforcement.  Id.  The court also cited Chapter 17 of the Code of Court Proce-
dure, which specifies that private documents or recordings may be subpoenaed 
for trial.  Id.  Furthermore, the court held that the Internet was not a broadcasting 
network within the meaning of Finnish law, and that the protections of section 29 
of the Telecommunications Law thus did not apply to the Internet.  Id. at 4. 
152. Id. at 3-4.  Helsingius argued that it would be a criminal offense for 
him, as the operator of a communications service, to disclose the contents of 
messages sent through his service, similar to the punishments provided for dis-
closure of confidential mail or telegraph communications.  Id. at 3; see also supra 
note 129 (discussing the Finnish Criminal Code’s protections of privacy).  The 
court held that the protection of mail secrecy in Finnish law did not apply to 
Usenet posts which were meant to be read globally.  Helsingius at 3.  Thus, 
Helsingius would not be guilty of a criminal offense under the Criminal Code or 
the Personal Data File Act if he disclosed the identities of the users sought by the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 3-4.  Notably, the District Court left open the possibility that elec-
tronic mail sent privately from computer to computer, rather than posted on a 
public Internet forum, might be protected under Finnish law. 
153. Id. at 2 (citing §§ 20, 23, 24, 25, 32, 37 of Chapter 17 of the Finnish Code 
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however, was based solely on the fact that electronic mail 
was not specifically included in the Finnish personal privacy 
statute, rather than any lack of sympathy to Helsingius’ 
cause.154 
As of this writing, Helsingius plans to appeal the rul-
ing,155 and at least one former Finnish appellate judge has 
expressed the opinion that the constitutional protection of 
privacy in Finland applies to e-mail communications.156 In 
addition, the Finnish legislature has indicated that it will re-
form the personal privacy laws in the spring of 1997 to pro-
vide for the protection of electronic communications.157 
Thus, the window of opportunity for law enforcement agen-
cies to obtain the identities of individuals who transmit mes-
sages through Finnish anonymous remailers is likely to be a 
narrow one. 
In the meantime, however, Helsingius closed 
anon.penet.fi, citing a need for clarification of the rights of 
Internet users.158 In the absence of a clearly defined regime 
                                                                                                                                  
of Court Operations and § 27(1) of the Pretrial Investigation Law). 
154. Id. at 4 (stating that “[w]hen the law has not now expressly regulated 
the circumstances which are in question, the interpretation cannot lead from this 
that [Finnish authorities] would have no right to get from Helsingius the [identi-
ties] of the senders”); see also Interview with Peter H. Lewis, Staff Reporter, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 1996). 
155. Letter from Johan Helsingius to Jonathan I. Edelstein (Sept. 15, 1996, at 
2) [hereinafter “Helsingius Letter”] (on file with author). 
156. Suviranta, supra note 129, at 59.  Suviranta is a retired President of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland.  Id. at 45, n.d.  The Supreme Adminis-
trative Court has a parallel jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Finland and is 
the court of highest jurisdiction in matters of administrative law.  See JAAKKO 
UOTILA, THE FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM 92-93 (2d ed. 1985).  Administrative jurisdic-
tion occupies an important position in Finnish law and has increased in impor-
tance in recent decades.  Id.  Administrative law courts in Finland handle a great 
many cases that would fall within the purview of Article III courts in the United 
States, and a member of the Supreme Administrative Court is a highly regarded 
jurist who carries considerable legal authority.  See id. 
157. Interview with Peter H. Lewis, Staff Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
1996); see also Helsingius Letter, supra note 155, at 2 (stating that Helsingius ex-
pects to see changes in Finnish law to accommodate the Internet, although these 
might be separate from the telecommunications regulations). 
158. Lewis, supra note 36, at D2. 
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for disclosure of evidence in cyberspace, the anon.penet.fi af-
fair has proved destructive both to Finnish civil society and 
to the Internet community.159 
B. Transnational Law Enforcement in Cyberspace 
The anon.penet.fi affair illustrates the difficulties faced 
by law enforcement agencies in combating electronic crime.  
Many, if not most, criminal acts committed over the Internet 
are international in scope, as evidenced by the high percent-
age of anon.penet.fi accounts held by American users.160 If 
the Communications Decency Act of 1995,161 or some similar 
measure, eventually passes constitutional muster in the 
United States, it is possible that many more Americans will 
choose to route potentially illegal messages through anony-
mous remailers in foreign countries.  In countries such as 
 
159. Another instructive incident involving the Church of Scientology oc-
curred recently in the Netherlands.  On September 5, 1995, the Religious Tech-
nology Center and its Dutch attorneys, the law firm of Nauta-Dutilh, prevailed 
upon the Dutch police to raid the offices of XS4ALL, an anonymous remailer 
service over which copyright-protected Scientology material was allegedly being 
sent.  Police and Members of Scientology Church Enter Offices of XS4ALL, M2 
PRESSWIRE, Sept. 6, 1995 [hereinafter XS4ALL].  The material at issue was in-
cluded in a document called the F.A.C.T.NET Kit, which was published on the 
World Wide Web homepage of a user whose Internet address was 
fonss@xs4all.nl.  Id.  The Religious Technology Center filed for seizure of the as-
sets of XS4ALL, following which the Dutch police recorded the serial numbers of 
XS4ALL’s computers in accordance with standard Dutch procedure.  Id.; see also 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1995).  The 
operation of the hacktic.nl Internet access service, which operated XS4ALL, has 
continued undisturbed, but hactic has shut down the XS4ALL remailer under 
pressure from the Church of Scientology.  Lewis, supra note 36, at D2.  In this in-
stance as well, it is clear that the lack of clear parameters under which the ano-
nymity of Internet users can be breached can result in the closing of beneficial 
services under pressure from organizations who use strong-arm tactics in their 
efforts to enforce the law.  XS4ALL, supra; see also supra notes 134-58 and accom-
panying text (describing the Helsingius affair).  The regulation of anonymous 
remailers would be better left to a well-defined international legal regime with 
clear procedures for obtaining the identities of individual users without impos-
ing liability upon the operators of remailer services.  See Turner, supra note 40, at 
11. 
160. See Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
161. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, § 502 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 
(1994)). 
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Finland which have strong personal privacy laws, foreign 
courts’ cooperation in determining the source of anonymous 
messages will not be easy to obtain.  If, as seems likely, Fin-
land’s telecommunications law is reformed next year to 
protect the privacy of Internet communications,162 the Fin-
nish police and courts will be highly reluctant in light of the 
lessons learned from the Erlich incident to pierce the ano-
nymity of anon.penet.fi’s users. 
Traffickers in pornography or stolen data can eliminate 
even more of the risk that their identity will be discovered 
by routing their merchandise through a series of remailers in 
several different countries.163 A pornographic image might 
thus be encoded in a country where pornography is legal, 
and routed through a remailer in another nation with 
stronger privacy statutes to further ensure that the traf-
ficker’s identity will not be revealed.164 If the image passes 
through several remailers, where merely one of these re-
mailers is located in a nation with strong computer secrecy 
laws, the electronic trail of evidence will be broken.165 
In the future, an even more disturbing possibility exists.  
At present, the majority of anonymous remailers are oper-
ated by civil libertarians who see themselves as protectors of 
free speech.166 By and large, however, these remailer opera-
tors are opposed to their services being used in the commis-
sion of crimes, and often attempt to police their remailers.167 
 
162. Interview with Peter H. Lewis, Staff Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
1996); see also Helsingius Letter, supra note 155, at 2. 
163. Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 15. 
164. See id. 
165. Froomkin, supra note 34, at 400 (“If even one nation with extensive 
Internet connections chooses not to regulate the provision of anonymizing tech-
nology, the effect is to make anonymous communication possible by all persons 
connected to the Internet . . . .”). 
166. Lewis, supra note 77, at 10. 
167. See Detweiler, supra note 57, § 4.1 (quoting a Usenet post by Helsingius 
in which he warns users that “anybody posting copyrighted material will be 
blocked from the server.”).  Detweiler also includes a guide to ethical operation 
of anonymous remailers in section 1.2 of his FAQ, suggesting that operators 
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Helsingius, for example, did not allow the transmission of 
photographs over anon.penet.fi, and sets a limit on message 
sizes sufficiently low to further ensure that no pornographic 
pictures are forwarded.168 Information on how to report 
abuse of anonymous accounts is appended to every message 
transmitted via anon.penet.fi,169 and Helsingius claims to 
have banned several hundred users for illegal activities or 
harassment.170 
C. The Specter of “Offshore Databases” 
The next logical step for electronic criminals, therefore, is 
to establish their own anonymous remailers for the sole pur-
pose of conducting illegal activities.171 Anonymous remailers 
are easy to set up:  Kleinpaste’s original universal remailer 
matured from concept to completion in a single afternoon.172 
The operation of an anonymous remailer has been described 
as “trivial[ly] easy” by Helsingius,173 and is inexpensive by 
organized crime’s standards:  Helsingius spent approxi-
mately $500 to $700 monthly to maintain and operate his 
                                                                                                                                  
“formulate a plan for problematic ethical situations” and create a published pol-
icy outlining the circumstances under which action will be taken against a user 
and the types of action that will be taken.  Id. § 1.2.  In the same section, Det-
weiler also warns users of anonymous remailers to “be prepared to forfeit [their] 
anonymity if [they] abuse the privilege.”  Id. 
168. Akst, supra note 44, at 1. 
169. A signature file automatically appended to every message that passed 
through Helsingius’ remailer instructed that inappropriate use was to be re-
ported to help@anon.penet.fi.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing signature files). 
170. Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
171. Even Vince Cate, the proprietor of Offshore Information Services, has 
expressed “concern” that his service is being used for illegal ends and indicated 
willingness to investigate criminal uses of his Internet access server.  Businesses 
Promote Fraud Tools, supra note 1, at D2.  It is therefore logical that on-line crimi-
nals seeking maximum freedom of action would establish their own anonymiz-
ing devices in order to avoid contending with concerned system administrators 
who might investigate their activities or voluntarily cooperate with law enforce-
ment authorities. 
172. See Branscomb, supra note 26, at 1659. 
173. Lavin, supra note 32, at 1.  Helsingius adds that “any competent pro-
grammer could [set up an anonymous remailer] in a couple of days.”  Id. 
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service.174 
The establishment of a dedicated anonymous remailer is 
thus well within the reach of traffickers in illegal informa-
tion.  All that is necessary is a compliant nation, willing to 
enact the necessary computer privacy laws.175 There is clear 
historical precedent for this in the rise of “offshore banks” in 
Third World countries seeking to gain foreign exchange by 
providing a safe haven for money launderers.176 If an im-
poverished nation can be persuaded in similar fashion to en-
act an airtight computer secrecy law, the door will be 
opened to the creation of “offshore databases” operated by 
local contacts for the benefit of organized crime. 
D. The Example of Offshore Banking 
The problem of international law enforcement in cyber-
space, as previously stated, is similar to the growing prob-
lem posed by offshore banking.177 Both problems are, at 
heart, technology-based; the rise of offshore banking was fa-
cilitated by the development of technologies that made it 
possible to complete “cross-border transactions . . . in a mat-
ter of seconds.”178 Both problems are international in scope, 
and have posed unprecedented problems for international 
law enforcement.179 The problem of offshore banking is also 
 
174. Id.  Helsingius established his anonymous remailer on a computer 
equipped with an Intel 386 chip, which is two generations behind the current 
standard of personal computer design.  Stark, supra note 130, at 104.  Logically, it 
would be even easier to establish and operate an anonymous remailer service on 
a state-of-the-art personal computer. 
175. See Akst, supra note 44, at D1. 
176. In 1992, for example, the Cayman Islands, with a population of 13,000, 
contained 548 banking institutions with a total of $400 billion in assets, making 
this small Caribbean nation second only to Switzerland as a world banking cen-
ter.  Where the Money Washes Us:  Colony’s Wealth Stems from the Rule that Money 
Flows to the Places that Regulate Least, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 16, 1992, at A19. 
177. See Lavin, supra note 43, at 7. 
178. Bruce Zagaris & Scott B. MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial Fraud 
and Technology:  The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & 
ECON. 62, 62 (1st ed. 1992). 
179. Id. at 72-73. Zagaris and MacDonald note that: 
[T]he very same instruments and markets that facilitate international fi-
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exacerbated by the lack of binding, uniform laws in all coun-
tries with international banks.180 
The rise of offshore banking occurred commensurately 
with the rise of international drug trafficking, and provided 
a convenient method for drug traffickers to safeguard and 
conceal the source of their profits.181 Consequently, during 
the mid-1980s, the growing efforts by national governments 
to deal with the problem of drug trafficking led to the crea-
tion of an international legal regime to facilitate the control 
of offshore banks.182 This took the form of international con-
ventions,183 multilateral agreements,184 and bilateral treaties 
                                                                                                                                  
nance and make countries interdependent also represent potential 
threats to the international financial system.  In particular, introducing 
increasingly new technology into the marketplace, and the resultant 
global financial integration, means that international borders represent 
less and less of an obstacle for both licit and illicit activities.  Economist 
Richard O’Brien has called this the “end of geography,” which he de-
scribes as “a state of economic development where . . . regulators no 
longer hold full sway over their regulatory territory; that is, rules no 
longer apply solely to specific geographical frameworks . . . .” 
Id. (quoting RICHARD O’BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION:  THE END OF 
GEOGRAPHY 1 (1992)). 
180. Thomas F. McInerney III, Towards the Next Phase in International Banking 
Regulation, 7 DE PAUL BUS. L.J. 143, 143-44 (1994). 
181. Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 177, at 63-64. 
182. Id.  A primary focus of anti-drug efforts since the 1980s has been money 
laundering, “based on the premise that attacking the profits of such activities is 
the best strategy against large, multinational criminal organizations.”  Id. 
183. See, e.g., Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (“UN Narcotics Convention”) at art. 
3(1)(b), 3(1)(c)(i) (requiring signatory nations to criminalize money laundering).  
The Convention also set out specific enforcement procedures.  Id. at art. 7.  Sec-
tions 8 through 19 of Article 7 of the UN Narcotics Convention provide a stan-
dard format by which nations not bound by a functioning mutual legal assis-
tance treaty may seek legal assistance in enforcing drug laws and investigating 
narcotics offenses.  In general, Article 7 provides for a narrower scope of coop-
eration than is usual in the terms of a bilateral legal assistance treaty.  See id. at 
art. 7(8)-(19). 
184. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991); Model Regu-
lations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking 
and Related Offenses, OEA/ser. L./XIV.2/CICAD/INF58/92 (May 23, 1992) 
(promulgated by CICAD, an anti-drug-abuse organization within the Organiza-
tion of American States). 
    
268 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:231 
between national governments.185 
These agreements, as well as purely national laws, have 
sought to enforce a number of measures designed to make it 
easier to trace illicit transactions.  The task of law enforce-
ment was complicated by the long-standing tradition of se-
crecy in the financial world, and the recognition that bank-
ing secrecy has legitimate uses—for example, a corporation 
might wish to hide a financial transaction from a competitor 
in order not to lose a business advantage.  Thus, the regula-
tion of offshore banking had to balance a legitimate need for 
financial privacy with the necessity of enforcing the law in 
an “instantaneous economy.”186 
Among the measures taken to accomplish this have been 
the increased use of reporting regulations to establish an au-
dit trail for sophisticated transactions,187 “know your cus-
tomer” requirements which obligate financial institutions to 
make inquiries and maintain files as to the identities of ac-
count holders,188 mandatory reporting of complex, unusual 
and large transactions,189 and increased supervision of banks 
to insure that they police themselves for illicit financial 
transactions.190 These regulations, while preserving banking 
secrecy for legitimate users, have the effect of creating a sys-
tem of vigilance and record-keeping that makes it easier to 
spot illicit transactions and trace them once they are identi-
fied.191 
 
185. See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text (discussing MLATs and 
the U.S.-Venezuela banking regulation agreement). 
186. Zagaris and MacDonald use the term “instantaneous economy” to de-
scribe an environment in which financial transactions are not limited by time.  
See id. at 62. 
187. Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 178, at 82-83. 
188. Id. at 85. 
189. Id. at 85-86 (citing Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) and CICAD 
regulations).  FATF is a creation of the Group of Seven Leading Economic Coun-
tries (G-7).  Id. at 64. 
190. Id. at 88. 
191. See generally id. at part I (discussing emerging financial technologies 
and their legitimate and illegitimate uses). 
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A landmark in law enforcement cooperation in the area 
of offshore banking was the bilateral agreement entered into 
by the United States and Venezuela in 1990.192 This was the 
first agreement between two nations to exchange currency 
transaction information, recorded by financial institutions in 
each country, for use in law enforcement.193 The agreement 
contained specific reporting requirements and outlined a 
formal procedure for making requests.194 Requests for assis-
tance could be denied only if deemed likely to prejudice the 
security, public policy or essential interests of the requested 
party.195 
Since then, the United States has entered into agreements 
with other countries requiring a minimal level of regulatory 
supervision and information sharing, including customer 
and transaction reporting requirements.196 The focus of off-
shore banking regulation has been on reliable record-
keeping and on measures which would allow law enforce-
ment agencies to pierce banking secrecy under circum-
stances where a violation of the law is suspected.197 
One of the key methods by which international enforce-
ment of money laundering regulations has been enhanced is 
the use of mutual legal assistance treaties, or MLATs.198 An 
MLAT is a bilateral treaty which creates binding obligations 
between the treaty partners to assist each other in criminal 
investigations.199 An MLAT combines enforcement and co-
 
192. Agreement Regarding Cooperation in the Prevention and Control of 
Money Laundering Arising from Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances, Nov. 5, 1990, U.S.-Venez., Hein’s No. KAV 2802, 30 I.L.M. 
250 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1991). 
193. Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 178, at 94. 
194. Id. at 95. 
195. Id.  The requested party may also postpone granting a request if it will 
interfere with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or other administrative pro-
ceeding taking place in that country.  Id. 
196. See id. at 93. 
197. See id. 
198. See generally Knapp, supra note 46. 
199. Id. at 405.  Most MLATs contain a standard list of forms of assistance 
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operation in criminal matters by first identifying a specific 
area or areas where the signatory nations have agreed to co-
operate, and then creating legal mechanisms to facilitate the 
transfer of information regarding these areas.200 In addition, 
MLATs can allow foreign intrusion into areas that are tradi-
tionally the preserve of domestic courts and legislatures.201 
For instance, the MLAT between the United States and Swit-
zerland, designed to combat bank frauds, provides that the 
terms of treaty take precedence over any inconsistent provi-
sions of the law of the contracting states.202 
MLATs are a relatively recent addition to international 
legal procedure,203 and represent a considerable advance 
                                                                                                                                  
available to requesting parties, including: 
(a) locating or identifying persons or items; 
(b) serving documents; 
(c) taking the testimony or statements of persons; 
(d) transferring persons in custody for testimony or other purposes; 
(e) providing documents, records and articles of evidence; 
(f) executing requests for searches and seizures; 
(g) immobilizing assets; 
(h) assisting in proceedings related to forfeiture and restitution; and 
(i) any other assistance consistent with the objects of this Treaty mutu-
ally acceptable to the Central Authorities of the Contracting Parties. 
Treaty with Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 104-21, art. 1.2 (1995) (“Austrian-American MLAT”). 
200. See Vassalo, supra note 118, at 188. 
201. See id. 
202. Id. (citing Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 
25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., art.9, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2035 (“Swiss-American MLAT”)). 
203. The Swiss-American MLAT, which entered into force officially in 1977, 
was the first major MLAT to be entered into by the United States.  Vassalo, supra 
note 119, at 189.  As of 1994, the United States had functioning MLATs with 17 
foreign jurisdictions.  These are Jamaica, Uruguay, Spain, Argentina, Bahamas, 
Mexico, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy, Colombia, 
Thailand, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Morocco.  McInerney, supra note 179, at 
148 n.27.  The MLAT between the United States and the United Kingdom was 
expanded to include the Cayman Islands, a British colony, in 1986.  Treaty Con-
cerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 26 
I.L.M. 536 (1987) (“Cayman Islands MLAT”).  The Cayman Islands MLAT was 
further extended to include Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, and the Turks 
and Caicos Islands in 1990 and Montserrat in 1991.  See 30 I.L.M. 250 (1991); 30 
I.L.M. 1147 (1991) (describing agreements to expand the Cayman Islands MLAT, 
effected by exchange of notes between the United States and the United King-
dom).  Most recently, the United States concluded an MLAT with the Russian 
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over previous international evidence-gathering proce-
dures204 in that they allow requests for information to be 
processed by central authorities established by the signatory 
nations rather than being sent through diplomatic chan-
nels.205 In the specific areas delineated in an MLAT as being 
subject to cooperation,206 a great many procedural barriers 
which exist under the traditional regime of letters rogatory 
are eliminated.207 
Multilateral conventions such as the UN Narcotics Con-
vention208 may also function as means of obtaining legal as-
sistance in money laundering investigations.209 Although in-
ternational conventions are not directly enforceable in the 
member states of the United Nations,210 signatories to the 
Narcotics Convention are required to adopt legislation 
which will aid in identifying and freezing assets which are 
                                                                                                                                  
Federation, which entered into force on Feb. 5, 1996.  See Agreement Between the 
United States and Russia on Cooperation in Criminal Law Matters, State Dept. 
No. 96-38, KAV No. 4518 (1996) (“Russian-American MLAT”).  A proposed 
MLAT with Austria received its first reading in the Senate on Sept. 6, 1995.  See 
Austrian-American MLAT, supra note 198, Letter of Transmittal. 
204. The traditional method of requesting evidence from a foreign jurisdic-
tion is through “letters rogatory,” which are requests issued by the court system 
of the requesting nation and delivered through diplomatic channels to the courts 
of the foreign jurisdiction.  Vassalo, supra note 118, at 188.  This procedure was 
time-consuming and often costly due to the precise drafting necessary to insure 
that the letter would comply with the procedures of the foreign jurisdiction and 
be considered by its courts.  Id. 
205. Id. 
206. The Russian-American MLAT contains an annex delineating specific 
criminal offenses in connection with which cooperation will be rendered, includ-
ing organized crime activity, money laundering, trafficking in nuclear weapons, 
drug trafficking, fraud, violent crimes against individuals, and sexual offenses 
against children.  See Annex to Russian-American MLAT, supra note 202; Rus-
sian-American MLAT, art. 2.1.  The Cayman Islands MLAT defines the area of 
cooperation more broadly to include, in addition to the offenses enumerated in 
the treaty, “any conduct punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment un-
der the laws of both the Requesting and Requested Parties.”  Cayman Islands 
MLAT, supra note 202, art. 19.3(a). 
207. Id. 
208. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). 
209. McInerney, supra note 180, at 165. 
210. Id. 
    
272 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:231 
the proceeds of drug activities,211 and are forbidden from 
denying legal assistance to other signatory nations because 
of local banking secrecy laws.212 
The bilateral and multilateral treaty relationships devel-
oped to control offshore banking provide a model approach 
to the problem of international law enforcement in an at-
mosphere where cross-border transactions and secrecy are 
made easy by technology and conflicting national law.  A 
similar set of solutions may be effective in protecting liberty 
but controlling secrecy in the analogous environment of cy-
berspace.213 
The analogy between international banking regulation 
and the Internet is further demonstrated by the use of 
emerging technologies and institutions by law enforcement 
agencies to monitor international financial activities.  By 
means of computerized payment systems such as the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) 
and the Clearing House for International Payments Systems 
(“CHIPS”), agencies can create an electronic trail through 
which they may monitor transactions, thus turning emerging 
banking technologies to the service of law enforcement as 
well as crime.214 Law enforcement agencies may also put he 
growing technology of the Internet to use; for example, the 
United States and British governments have already debated 
the use of the “Clipper chip,” which would allow law en-
forcement agencies, pursuant to a court order, to decode and 
analyze encrypted data.215 
 
211. UN Narcotics Convention, supra note 183, art. 5. 
212. Id. at art. 7(5). 
213. See infra notes 247-303 (discussing law enforcement measures to control 
Internet anonymity). 
214. McInerney, supra note 180, at 147 (“[CHIPS and SWIFT] may provide 
an additional fulcrum for domestic regulators to apply when seeking to uncover 
illegal and destabilizing transfers of funds . . . . Moreover, the fact that these sys-
tems are located in the United States creates some leverage over other countries 
seeking to use the system”). 
215. For a more thorough analysis of the legal issues involved with the 
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In addition, the banking industry engages in a great deal 
of self-regulation through organizations and supervisory 
banks.216 At least one authority has suggested that the Inter-
net be constituted, in a similar manner, as an independent 
and self-governing jurisdiction with its own courts, laws, 
and law enforcement mechanisms.217 Such a jurisdiction 
would have its own legislative bodies which would be em-
powered to define and enforce community standards on the 
Internet.218 This would, in many ways, be similar to the pri-
                                                                                                                                  
Clipper chip and the system of key escrow (a program under which decoding 
information for all marketed encryption devices is placed in an “escrow account” 
to which law enforcement agents may have access under certain circumstances), 
see Froomkin, supra note 39; Henry R. King, Big Brother, The Holding Company:  A 
Review of Key Escrow Encryption Technology, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
224 (1995); Christopher E. Torkelson, The Clipper Chip:  How Key Escrow Threatens 
to Undermine the Fourth Amendment, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1142 (1995).  See also 
Robert Uhlig, Ministers Seek Net Codebuster:  Technology Minister Ian Taylor Backs a 
System That Lets the State Read Our Private E-Mail Reports, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(LONDON), Apr. 23, 1996, at 2 (discussing the issues surrounding the implementa-
tion of the Clipper chip in the UK). 
216. See Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 178, at 88.  Law enforcement au-
thorities often work through regulatory and supervisory agencies internal to the 
banking industry and encourage such agencies to share information with each 
other and with investigators.  Id. 
217. Branscomb, supra note 26, at 1666-69.  Earlier in her article, Branscomb 
offers several examples of Internet communities enforcing community standards 
through mail-bombing, massive censure or expulsion from a particular Internet 
service.  Id. at 1656-63.  At least one of these incidents, involving a participant in 
a virtual community who was ousted for committing a “virtual rape” on a female 
character, turned into a formal debate over community standards and ended in a 
referendum on expulsion among registered members of the community.  Id. 
218. See id.; see also David G. Post, Virtual Magistrates, Virtual Law, AM. LAW., 
July/Aug. 1996, at 104, describing Tierney v. Email America, VM Docket # 96-
0001 (May 20, 1996) (decision available at http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080 on the 
World Wide Web).  Tierney was the first case to be decided by the “Virtual Mag-
istrate.”  Id.  The Virtual Magistrate is an on-line arbitration system established 
by the Cyberspace Law Institute, the American Arbitration Association, Villa-
nova Law School, and the National Center for Automated Information Research.  
Id.  A complete description of the Virtual Magistrate project, including a concept 
paper, rules, and procedures for submitting a complaint, can be found at 
http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080.  The Virtual Magistrate is an on-line arbitration 
project designed to resolve disputes involving users of on-line systems, those 
who claim to be harmed by wrongful messages, and complaints or demands for 
remedies directed at system operators.  Id. 
 Tierney, which was decided by N.M. Norton Jr. of Wright, Lindsey & Jen-
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vate securities and banking regulatory organizations which 
police their industries against illicit financial transactions.219 
III. ANONYMITY AND PUBLIC ORDER:  A PROPER BALANCE IS 
 NECESSARY 
Anonymous remailers will be a part of the Internet for 
the foreseeable future.  With the constitutional protection en-
joyed by anonymity in many Western countries, and the pro-
fessed desire of certain other nations to act as “data havens,” 
it is unlikely that private data transmission over the Internet 
will be universally banned or even seriously curtailed.220 
Nonetheless, just as with the similar problem of offshore 
banking, common-sense measures can be agreed upon be-
tween nations that would minimize the potential for viola-
tion of the law through anonymous transmission of data.221 
This section will examine several proposals which may be 
taken to ease the task of law enforcement on the Internet.  
These include a technology-based approach similar to the 
“key escrow” encryption technology which has been debated 
by American and European governments, a self-governing 
Internet jurisdiction with the power to resolve disputes in 
cyberspace, an international convention on Internet crime, 
and the use of MLATs to assist in gathering evidence and 
prosecuting international cybernetic crime. 
A. Practical Issues Must Be Considered in Control of 
 Anonymity 
It is clear that the combination of readily obtained ano-
nymity and easy transmission of information across national 
borders creates an environment hostile to law enforcement 
                                                                                                                                  
Jennings (Little Rock), involved a complaint about deceptive advertising sent in 
bulk to subscribers of America Online.  Tierney, VM Docket # 96-0001 (May 20, 
1996).  Norton ruled that America Online should delete the offending advertise-
ment.  Id. 
219. See generally Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 178, at part III. 
220. See Strassmann & Marlow, supra note 97. 
221. See supra notes 187-216 and accompanying text (discussing measures 
that have been taken to combat the dangers of offshore banking). 
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and extremely friendly to crime.222 Any attempt by national 
or international agencies to control the traffic of information 
through anonymous remailers, however, must walk a fine 
line between privacy and public order.  Anonymity enjoys a 
limited degree of constitutional protection in the United 
States;223 in addition, information privacy is vital in a me-
dium as open to public access as the Internet.224 There are a 
large number of legitimate reasons why Internet users might 
seek to protect their anonymity.225 A complete ban on 
anonymous remailers, as some authorities have advocated226  
and as the State of Pennsylvania has recently enacted,227 
would have a drastic chilling effect on legitimate political, 
therapeutic, and recreational uses of the Internet.228 Some 
 
222. See supra notes 81-120 and accompanying text (discussing illegitimate 
uses of anonymous remailers). 
223. See, e.g, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) 
(permitting the distribution of anonymous political leaflets).  McIntyre is cur-
rently regarded as the leading case in this area.  See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589 (1977) (establishing a balancing test for determination of the right to informa-
tional privacy, setting public interest against the individual’s interest in protect-
ing himself from disclosure); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (overturning 
a municipal ban on distribution of anonymous pamphlets); Gilbert v. Allied 
Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding that journalists pos-
sess “a privilege from revealing their confidential news sources in civil proceed-
ings that may be abrogated only in rare and compelling circumstances.”).  For an 
excellent discussion of the constitutional right to anonymity on the Internet, es-
pecially in the wake of the McIntyre decision, see generally Tien, supra note 39. 
224. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits 
that flow from privacy on the Internet). 
225. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing beneficial uses 
to which anonymous remailers have been put). 
226. See Hardy, supra note 30, at 1050-51; see also supra note 139 and accom-
panying text (stating that FBI Director Louis Freeh favors a ban on anonymous 
remailers).  In addition, at least one commentator has noted that if anonymous 
remailers are banned in the United States, “they will undoubtedly proliferate 
overseas.”  Chapman, supra note 139 at 10. 
227. PA. SESS. LAW ACT 1995-8 (amending 18 PA. C.J.A. 910 (a)(1)(ii)) makes it 
a crime to create, possess, or use a device which can be used to “conceal or assist 
another to conceal . . . the existence of place of origin or of destination of any 
telecommunication.”  See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (criminalizing the use of 
“misleading” identities on the Internet). 
228. Professor Tien argues, in his cogent defense of the constitutional right 
to anonymity on the Internet, that “online anonymity is also used innocuously.  
    
276 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:231 
features of Internet anonymity, however, such as anony-
mous transfer of digital cash, might be prohibited with little 
damage to the legitimate uses of Internet anonymity.229 
Any measures taken to lower the hurdles faced by law 
enforcement in piercing the secrecy of anonymous remailers 
must thus preserve intact all the legitimate uses of anonym-
ity.230 First, any remedies available to law enforcement 
should preserve the free flow of political and religious dis-
cussion over the Internet.231 This argues in favor of absolute 
protection of anonymity in messages which express political 
or religious opinions.  The confidentiality of persons partici-
pating in on-line self-help or therapy groups should also be 
preserved.232 
Another issue is raised by requirements, such as those 
contained in Finnish law, that a crime must be committed in 
the anonymous remailer’s host country, or that an offense 
must be committed which would constitute a crime in the 
host country, before a search warrant or disclosure order can 
be issued.233 Care must be taken when confronting this re-
                                                                                                                                  
There is something fundamentally misguided about basing any analysis of ano-
nymity on the anonymous threat or libelous message—extremes in the universe 
of social interaction.”  Tien, supra note 39, at 120 (citing numerous beneficial uses 
of anonymity on the Internet).  I agree with Professor Tien insofar as the benefits 
of anonymous communication on the Internet should be preserved and that an 
outright ban on anonymizing devices would be misguided.  From a law en-
forcement perspective, any analysis of the proper regime for regulating anonym-
ity on the Internet must necessarily take into account those individuals who 
abuse the ability to communicate anonymously and suggest means by which 
they may be brought under control. 
229. See Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra note 39, at par. 69 (not-
ing that, as “money equals speech in some political contexts, but . . . money can 
nonetheless be regulated in that context, it seems likely that anonymous money 
could be regulated more generally”). 
230. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (discussing the legitimate 
uses of anonymity on the Internet). 
231. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing use of anonymous 
remailers by political dissidents). 
232. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits that 
anonymous remailers provide to on-line self-help and therapy groups). 
233. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Finnish law re-
garding search warrants). 
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quirement to avoid assigning criminal responsibility to op-
erators of anonymous remailers which carry illegal traffic.  
Placing criminal responsibility on providers of electronic 
anonymity, such as that imposed on Internet access provid-
ers by the recent Communications Decency Act,234 would 
have the same practical effect as an outright ban on anony-
mous remailers.  It would be impossible for a the operator of 
a remailer such as anon.penet.fi, which had a daily traffic in 
excess of 8,000 messages,235 to completely prevent illegal ma-
terials from being routed through the service.236 Requiring 
operators of anonymous remailers to take certain common-
sense safeguards, such as the regulations imposed by 
anon.penet.fi, might not be out of place.237 In contrast, a legal 
regime which places vicarious criminal liability on operators 
whose services are abused by criminals would make opera-
tion of anonymous remailers impractical, if not impossible.  
Rather than imposing criminal liability on the operators of 
anonymous remailers, international evidence gathering 
should be made available even in the absence of a crime 
committed in the host country.238 
Establishment of mandatory safeguards should also be a 
 
234. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
133, § 502(e)(3). 
235. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing anon.penet.fi’s 
traffic volume). 
236. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that 
“current technology provides no feasible means for most content providers to 
avail themselves” of the two affirmative defenses provided in the Communica-
tions Decency Act for access services which carry prohibited communications); 
see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that Internet access 
providers may assert, as a defense to a prosecution under the CDA, they have 
“taken . . .  reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions . . . to restrict or prevent 
access by minors” to communications prohibited by the act, or that they have 
“restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit 
card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number.”) 
237. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing regulations 
imposed by anon.penet.fi.). 
238. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (discussing the informa-
tion-sharing requirements of the U.S.-Venezuelan anti-money-laundering 
agreement). 
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basis for limiting the civil liability of Internet access provid-
ers for materials transmitted over their services.  Liability 
could ideally be limited to failure to comply with the safe-
guards set forth in the international legal solution that is 
taken.  In light of the conclusion in Religious Technology Cen-
ter v. Netcom,239 in which the court held that an Internet ac-
cess provider is not a common carrier which is absolutely 
immune from liability under 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3),240 care 
should be taken to limit the circumstances under which op-
erators of remailers can be held civilly liable for tortious or 
criminal materials transmitted over their services. 
Imposition of broadly based civil liability on operators of 
anonymous remailers would have a chilling effect almost as 
great as if criminal liability were imposed.241 Service provid-
ers would be tempted to censor the messages they carry in 
order to avoid liability.  Even worse, some might be forced 
to close due to damages imposed for failure to police their 
networks.242 Because the Netcom  court’s holding that Inter-
net access providers could be held liable for their message 
traffic was based largely upon the determination that the 
message traffic was under the access provider’s indirect con-
trol,243 it would only be fair to limit the access provider’s li-
 
239. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
240. Id. at 1369 n.12 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1994)). 
241. See supra notes 158-59 (concerning the closure of the anon.penet.fi and 
XS4ALL remailers due to pressure from the Church of Scientology’s civil law-
suits). 
242. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (holding that Internet access providers 
may be held liable for tortious messages posted on the networks they manage).  
As so many Internet access providers operate in the United States, American law 
is disproportionately influential on the environment of the Internet.  In addition, 
other nations such as Germany are considering, or have already implemented, 
legislation or regulations holding Internet access providers liable for messages 
transmitted over their networks.  See Germany Targets Compuserve, supra note 40. 
243. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12.  The Netcom court gave great weight 
to the doctrine that a common carrier “must not have any direct or indirect con-
trol over the content or selection of the primary transmission.”  Id.; see also Strat-
ton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Inc., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau 
Co. 1995) (“[T]he critical issue to be determined by this Court is whether the 
foregoing evidence establishes . . . that PRODIGY exercised sufficient editorial 
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ability to failure to comply with the controls mandated by 
law.  It is important, in any international legal solution to the 
problem of law enforcement in cyberspace, to insure that an 
anonymous remailer which complies with the measures 
mandated to ease the task of law enforcement authorities 
should not be infringed further in its ability to transmit 
anonymous messages for legitimate purposes.244 
Finally, any international solution to the law enforcement 
problems posed by anonymity must avoid inhibiting the 
growth of information technology.245 A legal regime, 
whether created by statute or treaty, that bans technologies 
or freezes technology at its current level would prevent in-
formation technology from achieving its full potential.246 
B. Law Enforcement Solutions on the Internet are Possible 
For better or for worse, the Internet has become one of 
the primary means of transmitting data in the modern 
                                                                                                                                  
control over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same 
responsibilities as a newspaper.”); Cubby Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 
135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that “[w]hile CompuServe may decline to carry a 
given publication altogether, in reality, once it dies decide to carry a publication, 
it will have little or no editorial control over that publication’s contents.”) 
244. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (discussing the unin-
tended consequences of law enforcement efforts regarding anonymous remail-
ers). 
245. See, e.g., David Ward, Sisyphean Circles:  The Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act, 22 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 267, 282 (1996) (stating 
that “[t]he [Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement] Act . . . operates 
as a disincentive for technological innovation and will likely retard competition.  
The Act impedes technological innovation by allowing governmental needs to be 
a determinative factor in the research and development decisions of telecommu-
nications carriers”); see also Ted Bunker, Is It 1984, LAN TIMES, Aug. 1994 (quot-
ing Roy Neel, President of the United States Telephone Association, as saying 
that “our nation cannot be held hostage to inexpert analysis of telecommunica-
tions technology as we move into the information age”). 
246. The effect of curtailment of research upon technological innovation, es-
pecially in the medical field, has often been commented upon.  See, e.g., Arizona:  
4 w/Parkinson Challenge State Fetal Tissue Ban, ABORTION REP., May 1, 1996 (quot-
ing Planned Parenthood executive director Virginia Yrun as saying that Ari-
zona’s ban on fetal tissue research “retard[s] the discovery and application of 
new lifesaving techniques”). 
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world, and will become more so in the future.247 With the 
growth of the Internet, privacy technologies such as anony-
mous remailers will no doubt also come into wider use, leav-
ing national governments with the difficult task of enforcing 
the law in an environment of widespread secrecy.248 Fortu-
nately, the example of offshore banking is available as a 
guide to developing law enforcement strategies for the Inter-
net.249 
The problem of anonymous remailers is not strictly 
analogous to that of offshore banking.  For one thing, it is 
much easier to establish an anonymous remailer than it is to 
set up a financial institution,250 and the “paper trail” of an 
anonymous message is much easier to hide.251 In addition, 
the legal regime governing cyberspace communications in 
most countries is not nearly as well-defined as that govern-
ing banking, which has traditionally been one of the most 
regulated areas of the business world.252 Thus, any agree-
ments or conventions relating to control of computer crime 
 
247. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the growth of 
the Internet). 
248. Strassmann and Marlow argue that, because anonymous remailers 
cannot be banned outright in the context of a free society: 
The best one can do is to start treating the pathologies inherent in the 
Internet in the same way as we have learned to deal with infectious 
epidemics.  That calls for constructing new institutions and processes 
that are analogues to inoculation, immunization, prophylactics, clean 
water supply, sewers, hygiene, early detection of outbreaks of diseases, 
quarantine, the offices of health examiners, the Center for Disease Con-
trol and the World Health Organization. 
Strassmann & Marlow, supra note 97.  This Note attempts to suggest means by 
which some or all of these goals can be accomplished without killing the meta-
phorical patient. 
249. See supra notes 187-216 and accompanying text (discussing law en-
forcement measures taken to control offshore banking). 
250. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (discussing the ease of 
establishing an anonymous remailer). 
251. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing means of increas-
ing the difficulty of tracing e-mail messages). 
252. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (describing a small por-
tion of the regulations that have been imposed on banking transactions).  Equiva-
lent regulations have not been enacted with regard to Internet access providers. 
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would have to define their terms, and the circumstances un-
der which they could be invoked, in even more detail than 
those governing financial crime. 
Nevertheless, the problems posed by offshore banking 
and by Internet anonymity are remarkably similar.  Both are 
based upon technologies which allow inexpensive, easy and 
secret transmission of information across international bor-
ders,253 both pose problems in law enforcement because of 
the privacy haven provided by certain nations,254 and both 
have legitimate uses but are widely used illegitimately.255 
Thus, some or all of the solutions which have proven effec-
tive in controlling offshore banking might be adapted for use 
in regulating anonymous communication on the Internet.256 
These include the use of technologies which ease the task of 
locating and tracing illicit data, increased self-regulation by 
the Internet itself, an international convention on Internet 
crime, and MLATs designed to combat trafficking in illegal 
data.257 
1. A Technology-Based Approach? 
It may be possible to circumvent international law en-
forcement difficulties by utilizing technologies which facili-
tate data tracing by police agencies.  In a manner similar to 
the “Clipper chip” or to emerging technologies used to trace 
 
253. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text (regarding anonymous 
remailers); notes 178-80 and accompanying text (regarding offshore banks). 
254. See Akst, supra note 44, at D1. 
255. See supra notes 70-120 and accompanying text (discussing beneficial 
and criminal uses of anonymous remailers); supra notes 178-86 and accompany-
ing text (discussing offshore banking). 
256. See Froomkin, supra note 34, at 447-48.  Professor Froomkin argues that: 
Governments have demonstrated that they are capable of acting in con-
cert to seek to control activities such as money laundering which they 
perceive as a common threat . . . . As yet, there appears to be no equiva-
lent movement to control anonymous remailers, but it is not inconceiv-
able. 
Id. 
257. See supra notes 187-216 and accompanying text (discussing law en-
forcement measures relating to offshore banking). 
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financial transactions,258 the federal government could man-
date the inclusion in all new computers of technology which 
creates a unique and indelible signature on each outgoing 
message.  This would enable the information to be traced to 
its original source no matter what steps are taken to ensure 
anonymity en route.259 Presumably, messages would be 
traceable only by court order upon a prima facie showing 
that a criminal act has been committed over the Internet.260 
This proposal, while attractive in its simplicity, has a 
number of drawbacks.  For example, the privacy of indi-
viduals or services whose computers carried an encoded 
message en route to its destination might be compro-
mised.261 Moreover, any technological solution is vulnerable 
to being superseded by superior technology.  A technology 
which stamps a mandatory data signature on electronic mes-
 
258. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the “Clipper 
chip”). 
259. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the custom-
ized anonymity provided by sophisticated remailers). 
260. This requirement has a parallel in the Federal wiretapping statute.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2510-2521. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) provides that the interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications may be authorized if: 
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense . . . 
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications 
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger-
ous; 
(d) . . . there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or 
the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be 
intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with 
the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, 
or commonly used by such person. 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(d).  This statute could very easily be adapted to allow the 
investigating judge or magistrate to order the disclosure of an anonymous user’s 
identity under similar circumstances.  See Long, supra note 15, at 1205-06. 
261. An electronic message might pass through several computers or net-
works before reaching its destination.  Many of these may be merely carriers or 
relay stations through which the message passes on the way from source to des-
tination, and have nothing to do with the production, processing or publication 
of the message. 
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sages could potentially be defeated by another technology 
which erases or masks that signature.  Short of curtailing en-
tire lines of research in the field of encryption, which would 
inhibit the growth of information technology and endanger 
corporate data security,262 any technological edge gained by 
law enforcement could not be made to last forever. 
A more serious drawback, however, is the possibility that 
the veil of privacy might be breached by parties other than 
those authorized to penetrate it.  Thus far, computer “hack-
ers” have shown themselves able to break codes thought un-
breakable by their creators.263 A strong possibility exists that 
an ingenious hacker could devise a way to trace anonymous 
messages illegally, with possibly catastrophic consequences 
to the person or persons whose anonymity has been vio-
lated. 
2. The Option of Self-Government:  Is It Viable? 
As previously noted, a number of commentators have 
proposed that the Internet be constituted as a self-governing 
jurisdiction with its own laws and courts.264 Although this 
highly idealistic solution may eventually be possible, it 
would probably be unworkable at the present time.  Aside 
from the overriding question of where an Internet jurisdic-
tion would derive its power, the Internet is at present not a 
single community, but thousands of discrete communities 
with highly varying standards and norms.265 It is highly un-
likely, therefore, that the diverse users of the Internet would 
be able to agree on a constitution or construct a workable 
 
262. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of 
excessive regulation on technological advance). 
263. See, e.g., Dr. Marcus du Sautoy, Search for a Code that Breakers Can’t 
Crack:  Mind and Matter, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 11, 1995 (dealing with the solution 
of RSA-129, a hitherto secure code based on a 129-digit number arrived at 
through the multiplication of two prime numbers). 
264. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing self-
regulation). 
265. See generally Branscomb, supra note 26. 
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workable legislature.266 
Problems would also arise concerning the remedies 
available to an independent Internet jurisdiction.  As there 
are no “virtual jails,” the remedies available to an Internet 
court acting on its own resources would be limited to cen-
sure or expulsion from the Internet.  The latter remedy 
would be especially ineffective because of the ease of obtain-
ing a new Internet account under a pseudonym from an-
other of the thousands of competing Internet access provid-
ers.267 
An Internet jurisdiction might be workable in certain ar-
eas, especially those which involve offenses consisting solely 
of violation of Internet community standards, or which oc-
cur entirely on the Internet.268 Such a jurisdiction might also 
 
266. See generally Detweiler, supra note 57, providing excerpts from an ongo-
ing and passionately argued Internet debate over standards of behavior and the 
proper uses of anonymity.  The contentious nature of community standards on 
the Internet is especially apparent in sections 4.5, 6.1 and 7.3.  But see Branscomb, 
supra note 26, at 1665-70 (describing informal community regulation by Internet 
users in which a general consensus has developed over standards of “netiquette” 
or proper on-line behavior).  Informal “netiquette” standards have been estab-
lished by Internet communities consisting of users from a number of cultures 
and nations.  Id.; see also Hardy, supra note 30, at 1019-21 (comparing “netiquette” 
to the medieval “law merchant,” which provided a unified system of laws for 
merchants from varying countries who met at trade fairs). 
267. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
268. Professor Post argues that Internet-based arbitration services might be 
an ideal forum to adjudicate complaints of violation of the Internet’s developing 
community standards, and that their decisions, available on a worldwide data-
base, might constitute a “common law of cyberspace.”  Post, supra note 216, at 
104-05.  He additionally predicts that the deliberations of on-line courts might be 
accompanied by real-time commentary by observers in cyberspace, and that 
amicus briefs might be submitted by clicking a button at the arbitrator’s World 
Wide Web page.  Id. 
 Professor Post has also argued in connection with the Helsingius-Scientology 
debate that Internet law should take precedence over national law in areas in-
volving dissemination of information, including copyright protection.  David G. 
Post, New World War:  Critics of Scientology, REASON, Apr. 1996, at 28.  He argues 
that “it is the inhabitants of cyberspace, after all, who are in the best position to 
determine the varying shapes of a copyright law that can truly take account of 
the strange features of this new informational landscape.”  Id. Professor Post ac-
knowledges, however, that “the inhabitants of cyberspace, too, must develop 
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be an adequate forum to resolve disputes concerning on-line 
copyright infringement.269 A panel of authorities recently 
suggested the establishment of on-line arbitration boards 
empowered to make instant decisions as to whether a pub-
licly posted message violated a copyright.270 If the board de-
termined that a message was an infringement, it could order 
a commercial Internet provider to delete the offending mes-
sage.271 
Although this tribunal might be effective in curtailing 
publicly posted infringements, especially if its authority 
were backed by enabling legislation from a national gov-
ernment, it would still be ineffective in preventing the traf-
ficking of stolen data from computer to computer.  Although 
such a board might be able to make inroads into the stolen 
data market if it were empowered to delete advertisements 
offering stolen data for sale, it would be powerless to curtail 
such traffic entirely because much of it occurs privately and 
without advertisement.272 
In addition, although a message in this scenario would be 
subject to Internet law while traveling in cyberspace, it 
would still be subject to national law before it is introduced 
into the Internet and after it is received and downloaded.273 
The creation of an Internet jurisdiction, without further 
measures, would not solve the problem of tracing an 
anonymous message which violates national law to its 
source. 
3. An International Convention on Electronic Crime:   
                                                                                                                                  
mechanisms to recognize and respect the legitimate interests of individuals out-
side their borders.”  Id. 
269. Rory J. O’Connor, Cyberspace Experts Suggest Ways to Make On-Line 
Copyrights Secure, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 9, 1995, at D8. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing anonymous 
trafficking in stolen data on the Internet). 
273. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing attempts by na-
tional governments to regulate the Internet). 
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The Ultimate Solution 
Anonymity over the Internet has been compared to off-
shore banking:  useful in the secrecy it provides, but danger-
ous in the convenience it offers to criminals.274 It might be 
useful, therefore, to consider a similar solution:  an interna-
tional convention on Internet law enforcement similar to the 
treaty recently adopted by the United Nations to combat 
drug trafficking and money laundering.275 
An international convention, accompanied by a multilat-
eral treaty,276 would be well within the accepted bounds of 
international law277 and would be a powerful tool to combat 
Internet crime.  An international convention on computer 
crime would require signatory nations to take certain meas-
ures to combat criminal activity on the Internet.278 These 
might include, for example, a provision requiring signatory 
nations to order disclosure of the sources of messages 
transmitted via anonymous remailers upon a prima facie 
 
274. See Lavin, supra note 32, at 1. 
275. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the UN Narcotics 
Convention).  Mark Turner, a partner at the London law firm Garrett & Co., has 
recently advocated an international convention on Internet regulation in order to 
clarify the conflicts of rights created by differences in national law and prevent a 
drift toward the “highest common denominator” of regulation by Internet access 
providers in an effort to avoid liability.  See Turner, supra note 40, at 11. 
276. The convention, adopted by the United Nations or some other interna-
tional body, would form the framework for the multilateral treaty.  Without a 
multilateral treaty, a United Nations convention would not be binding on the 
signatory nations under the doctrine of dualism; that is, that states are not auto-
matically subject to the constraints of international law in the absence of imple-
menting legislation.  See McInerney, supra note 180, at 167-68. 
277. See id. at 168 n.163 (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States §§ 102(1)(b), 122(3), in support of international recogni-
tion of the right of nations to consent to binding treaties). 
278. Arguably, with the rise of “digital cash” and other means of conducting 
financial transactions over the Internet, it will soon be necessary to expand exist-
ing international conventions governing financial offenses into cyberspace.  A 
new convention on electronic crime could take in the offenses covered by prior 
conventions on money laundering and fraud, and also encompass new offenses 
unique to cyberspace.  See generally Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, supra 
note 39, at par. 41-43. 
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showing that a crime had been committed in the requesting 
nation.279 Such an order for disclosure would not be contin-
gent upon a finding that a crime had been committed in the 
host nation; thus, the requesting nation could investigate 
crimes under its law without the necessity of criminal re-
sponsibility being imposed upon the operator of the anony-
mous remailer.280 In fact, a convention might make disclo-
sure available for a strictly defined list of torts such as 
copyright infringement, allowing the victims of such torts to 
apply to the courts of their home nations for assistance in de-
termining the identity of the illicit distributors of their prop-
erty.281 
Such a convention could also close the loopholes through 
which child pornography is often transmitted over the Inter-
net by mandating that signatory nations include electronic 
media in their anti-pornography statutes.282 Much as the UN 
Convention on Narcotics Trafficking requires signatory na-
tions to criminalize money laundering,283 a convention on 
 
279. See UN Narcotics Convention, supra note 183, at art. 7(10) (setting forth 
information that must be provided when requesting legal assistance under the 
terms of the convention). 
280. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Finnish law relat-
ing to the February 1995 police raid on anon.penet.fi.). 
281. No known international law would limit the application of interna-
tional conventions or MLATs to criminal matters only.  See Vassalo, supra note 
118, at 192, n.139.  Access by private parties to procedures established under in-
ternational conventions or MLATs could be limited by a requirement that such 
parties apply to the courts or to a central law enforcement authority in their 
country of residence for approval of their requests for information. 
282. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that certain jurisdic-
tions do not prohibit child pornography carried over electronic media). 
283. UN Narcotics Convention, supra note 183, art. 3 (1)(b)(ii).  It should be 
noted, however, that each signatory nation to the convention is required to 
criminalize certain drug and money-laundering-related activities “subject to its 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system.”  Id. at art. 3 
(1)(c) This creates a loophole under which a number of signatory nations, such as 
Israel, have failed to enact anti-money-laundering statutes.  See Abraham Abra-
movsky, Partners Against Crime:  Joint Prosecutions of Israeli Organized Crime Fig-
ures by U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1903, 1910 (1996).  The 
negotiators of a convention against computer crime would have to take care, as 
far as possible, to eliminate such loopholes from the draft treaty, although this 
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Internet crime could similarly mandate the criminalization 
of such offenses as data theft, possession of stolen data,284 
and electronic vandalism.285 
Finally, an international convention on computer crime 
could regulate the use of anonymous remailers by mandat-
ing that signatory nations enact certain regulations limiting 
the right to anonymity.  Such regulations might include 
common-sense measures such as those already enforced by 
many remailer operators,286 including a maximum message 
size.287 A strict size limit would inhibit the transmission of 
pornographic materials or pirated software, while allowing 
the use of anonymous remailers for legitimate purposes such 
as political discussion or therapy.288 
An international convention, if ratified and strengthened 
                                                                                                                                  
may not be entirely possible due to fundamental differences in the criminal jus-
tice systems of the various member states of the United Nations. 
284. “Stolen” data can be defined to include not only data protected by 
copyright but also credit card or similar account numbers and confidential cor-
porate or legal material.  One model for such a definition might be the definition 
of “secret scientific material” contained in Section 155.00(6) of the New York 
State Penal Law.  This statute defines “secret scientific material” as property or 
records which “[are] not, and [are] not intended to be available to anyone other 
than the persons rightfully in possession thereof” and “accord or may accord 
such rightful possessors an advantage over competitors or other persons who do 
not have the knowledge or benefit thereof.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(6) 
(McKinney 1996). 
285. A multilateral treaty on international crime could be drafted, like most 
multilateral treaties, by a congress of technical experts from the negotiating 
countries.  See McInerney, supra note 180, at 167 n. 161.  A conference of Internet 
and legal experts drawn from the courts, corporations, and universities of the 
member states of the United Nations, could draft a treaty specifically tailored to 
the needs of law enforcement and Internet users, and define in concrete terms 
the acts which must be criminalized in order to create a lawful society in cyber-
space. 
286. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing regulations 
set by Helsingius for anon.penet.fi). 
287. Johan Helsingius is of the opinion that codification of a message size 
limit for anonymous remailers would be “too arbitrary,” but would support an 
international convention which clearly delineates the rights and obligations of 
Internet users and service providers.  Helsingius Letter, supra note 155, at 2. 
288. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing political and 
therapeutic uses of Internet anonymity). 
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by bans on sales of encryption technologies to non-signatory 
nations, would assist in easing law enforcement in cyber-
space and managing the right to anonymity in a rational 
manner while promoting full use of the Internet’s resources.  
Care would have to be taken to include a strict political of-
fense exception in any such convention,289 insuring that de-
mocratic nations could not be forced to disclose the identity 
of dissidents wanted for criticizing dictatorial govern-
ments.290 Any international convention on cybernetic crime 
would have to recognize not only the need for law enforce-
ment to trace illegal messages across national boundaries, 
but also the basic human right of free expression. 
4. An Interim Approach:  MLATs as a Means of 
Facilitating International Law Enforcement 
Cooperation 
The creation of an international convention on Internet 
crime will understandably take time; even more time will 
pass before enough nations ratify the convention to make its 
implementation comprehensive.291 In the meantime, the 
United States might increase its ability to enforce the law in 
cyberspace by establishing mutual legal assistance treaties 
 
289. The principle of the political offense exception, which is traditional in 
the law of extradition, permits a state to refuse an extradition request from an-
other state if the offense charged in the request is of a purely political nature.  See 
Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander, 11 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 18 n.63 (1995).  This principle could be adapted from the law 
of extradition to provide that disclosure of the identity of an anonymous user 
could be refused if the offense charged by the nation requesting disclosure was 
solely political in character. 
290. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing use of anonymous 
remailers by political dissidents). 
291. The UN Narcotics Convention, for example, was in force in 89 nations 
as of January 15, 1990.  Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assis-
tance and Related Matters, 18 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 339 (1990).  Since then, it has 
only been ratified by one other nation, bringing the total to 90.  Government Asks 
Parliament to Ratify Accords, MTI ECONEWS, Jan. 19, 1996.  See also Scott Sultzer, 
Money Laundering:  The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. 
REV. 143, 209 (1995) (indicating that only Chile had fully ratified the Organiza-
tion of American States’ model rules to combat money laundering). 
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(“MLATs”) with the host nations of anonymous remailers.292 
Much as MLATs governing money laundering enable 
law enforcement authorities to override local banking se-
crecy laws,293 an MLAT governing investigations of elec-
tronic crimes would enable police agencies to override host 
nations’ computer privacy laws when pursuing Internet 
criminals.  This cooperation, however, would be limited to 
the offenses delineated in the terms of the MLAT, thus pro-
viding a clear outline of when an Internet user’s right to 
anonymity may or may not be compromised.294 
Furthermore, MLATs need not require a showing of dual 
criminality295 to be invoked.  For instance, the MLAT con-
cluded in 1989 between the United States and Nigeria al-
 
292. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text (discussing the history 
and structure of MLATs). 
293. Knapp, supra note 46, at 407. 
294. MLATs commonly contain provisions limiting the circumstances under 
which assistance can be requested or under which information gained pursuant 
to the treaty can be used.  See Cayman Islands MLAT, supra note 202, Articles 3, 
7.  These may include requirements that information gained under the terms of 
the treaty be kept confidential and/or limiting the use of such information in ad-
ditional prosecutions or civil forfeiture proceedings.  Id. at Articles 3(2), 3(4). 
295. The principle of dual criminality requires a state to demonstrate that 
the offense charged in a request for extradition or legal assistance constitutes a 
crime both in the requesting and the requested nation.  See John G. Kester, Some 
Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1461 (1988).  Existing 
MLATs treat the dual criminality principle in various ways.  See Cayman Islands 
MLAT, supra note 202, articles 3.2, 19.3(a) 26 I.L.M. at 538 (containing no re-
quirement of dual criminality unless assistance is sought in connection with an 
offense not specifically enumerated in the treaty); Russian-American MLAT, su-
pra note 202, art. 3.1(2) (providing that the requested party may deny assistance 
if “the conduct under which the request is received would not constitute an of-
fense under the laws of the Requested State”); Austrian-American MLAT, supra 
note 198, art. 1.3 (providing that the requested party shall provide assistance re-
gardless of whether the conduct which is the subject of the request is a criminal 
offense in the requested nation, but that “the Requested State may refuse to com-
ply in whole or in part with a request for assistance to the extent that the conduct 
would not constitute an offense under its laws and the execution of the request 
would require a court order for search and seizure or other coercive measures.”).  
Because of the wide variation in national laws regarding financial crime, traffick-
ing in pornography and copyright, any MLAT dealing with computer crime 
should follow the pattern of the Cayman Islands MLAT. 
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lowed American authorities to call upon their Nigerian 
counterparts for assistance in the investigation of money 
laundering offenses, even though money laundering was not 
then a crime in Nigeria.296 An MLAT between the United 
States and Finland governing investigations of Internet 
crime would, if properly crafted, allow American law en-
forcement agencies to request Finnish authorities to order a 
remailer such as anon.penet.fi to disclose the source of an il-
legal message even though no crime had been committed in 
Finland.297 This would enable the United States to enforce its 
laws while eliminating the possibility of another Erlich inci-
dent298 which would pose a threat to the privacy of 
anon.penet.fi’s entire clientele.299 
In addition, due to the frequency of civil litigation stem-
ming from alleged copyright infringement in cyberspace, 
MLATs dealing with law enforcement on the Internet could 
be extended to a limited range of civil matters for the resolu-
tion of the specific problem of anonymity.300 Under such a 
treaty, a civil litigant might apply to the courts of his home 
nation for an order directing that the identity of the distribu-
tor of his allegedly protected materials be disclosed.  If he 
could show that he would be likely to prevail in litigation 
against the anonymous distributor, the court order would be 
transmitted for execution to the nation in which the anony-
mous remailer operated.  The standard of proof necessary 
for disclosure in civil matters would have to be relatively 
 
296. See Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the United States of America (Sept. 13, 1989).  
Money laundering was criminalized in Nigeria in 1990 by the Nigerian Drug 
Law Enforcement Act.  It should be noted that the Nigerian-American MLAT has 
not been ratified by the United States Senate. 
297. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (outlining Finnish law re-
garding disclosure in the context of the Helsingius affair). 
298. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (describing the Finnish 
police raid on anon.penet.fi in February 1995). 
300. See supra note 281 (stating that no known principle of international law 
prevents the use of legal assistance treaties in civil matters). 
    
292 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:231 
high, in order to protect the privacy rights of Internet users 
in situations where no crime is present.  If owners of intellec-
tual property are unable to determine the identity of those 
who violate their rights, however, those rights will become 
meaningless.301 
In civil matters, however, the scope of assistance avail-
able under the MLAT should be limited to disclosure of the 
identity of the putative defendant.  Once the aggrieved 
party’s right to know the identity of his opponent has been 
vindicated, further proceedings should be conducted accord-
ing to customary methods of civil procedure.  The disclosure 
process should also be strictly supervised by the courts of 
the requested nation, which should have the right to deny 
disclosure if, in their estimation, the allegations of tortious 
conduct were frivolous. 
The great majority, if not all, of the anonymous remailers 
currently in existence operate in Western Europe, the United 
States and Canada.302 Thus, the United States would be able 
to create a viable basis for evidence gathering in cyberspace 
by concluding MLATs with a few key nations.303 Although a 
 
301. See Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Helsingius (Helsinki Dist. Ct., Ânestys, 
J., Aug. 22, 1996), at 4 (acknowledging that the matter of copyright violation al-
leged by the Church of Scientology could only be resolved if the identity of the 
alleged violator was released by Helsingius). 
302. Raph Levien’s list of anonymous remailers includes one in Canada, one 
in Germany, one in Finland and 22 in the United States.  Levien, supra note 28.  A 
search on the Internet search utility Alta Vista revealed an additional remailer, 
“Sven’s Remailer,” operating in Belgium. 
303. The United Kingdom, rather than Finland, might be the first priority 
for the United States in concluding an MLAT targeted at investigation of com-
puter crime.  Many of the nations which are emerging as “data havens,” includ-
ing Barbados and Anguilla, are British colonies or members of the British Com-
monwealth.  An MLAT is already in force between the United States and the 
United Kingdom which pertains to the Cayman Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, 
the Turks and Caicos Islands and the British Virgin Islands, all of which are 
known centers of offshore banking and potential or actual locations of offshore 
databases.  The MLAT between the United States and the United Kingdom 
might easily be expanded to include provisions for disclosure of the identities of 
Internet users suspected of crime.  Other priorities in concluding MLATs include 
nations where anonymous remailers are known to operate and nations where the 
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comprehensive solution to the problem of anonymity and 
law enforcement in cyberspace will require a multilateral 
treaty, the United States would be able to go a long way to-
wards securing its law enforcement position by establishing 
binding treaty relationships with significant jurisdictions 
such as Finland.304 
CONCLUSION 
Anonymity in cyberspace is a controversial and vehe-
mently debated issue.  Proponents of the right to anonymity 
point to the legitimate and compelling reasons why Internet 
users might want or need to maintain their privacy in a pub-
lic forum.  Critics of anonymity, however, argue that the 
ease with which identities can be hidden in cyberspace, 
combined with the ability to transmit information across in-
ternational borders with impunity, facilitates crime and hin-
ders law enforcement. 
This conflict is particularly difficult to settle, largely be-
cause both sides are right.  Any solution to the problem of 
anonymity on the Internet must balance the right to privacy 
against the difficulties of international law enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                  
transmission, possession or sale of child pornography or other black-market data 
is legal.  Internet access services in nations meeting any of these conditions pos-
sess a high potential for illicit use.  See supra notes 81-120 (discussing the criminal 
potential of anonymous remailers). 
304. MLATs, combined with the previously-mentioned concept of a self-
governing Internet, may also provide an intriguing long-term solution to the 
problems posed by information transmitted through anonymous remailers.  If 
the Internet is recognized as a sovereign nation, it will possess the right to enter 
into treaties in the same manner as other nations.  It might therefore be possible 
to conclude an MLAT with the Internet itself, allowing anonymity to be pierced at 
any location on the Internet without regard to the national jurisdiction in which a 
remailer’s host computer is located.  Similarly, it would be possible for a sover-
eign Internet to become a signatory to an international convention governing 
computer crime.  It would thus be possible to obtain disclosure from multiple 
anonymous remailers, even if their host computers are located in several differ-
ent countries.  In addition, law enforcement agencies would then be able to trace 
the electronic trail of contraband information from start to finsih without the ne-
cessity of obtaining warrants from several jurisdictions. 
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A number of idealistic but impractical suggestions, such 
as a self-governing Internet, have been offered as solutions 
to this problem.  In reality, there is no way that Internet 
crime can be completely curtailed, any more than money 
laundering or drug trafficking can be entirely eliminated.  
An environment can be created, however, which greatly fa-
cilitates the ease of international evidence gathering in cy-
berspace while protecting the rights to privacy and free flow 
of information. 
The most comprehensive means of accomplishing such 
an environment would be a multilateral convention on com-
puter crime which specifies areas of cooperation in investi-
gation, closes loopholes which allow traffickers in child por-
nography and stolen data to operate with impunity in 
certain nations, and regulates the right to anonymity.  Before 
such a treaty is ratified, however, the United States can still 
strengthen its ability to enforce its laws by entering into bi-
lateral treaty relationships with key nations which share 
with it a common interest in combating computer crime. 
 
